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ABSTRACT
Responsivene ss literature has focussed primari ly on the relationship between public opinion and
policy outputs, The thermostatic model in particular provides both a comprehensive and well
supported framework fix this relationship . This thesis adds to the responsiveness literature by
explorin g the potentia lly thermostatic relationship between public opinion and ministerial
resignations in Canada from 1945 to 20 11. The impact or changes or public opinion on
resignations is explored qualitatively to highlight relevant variables. This analysis is
complemented with the use or honour ratios to test other potential causes or resignation s iha:
have been highlighted in the qualitative analysis and resignation literature. Finally. regression
models are used to determine the significance or the impact or public opinion on ministerial
resignations and resignations on public opinion. Though no significant relation ship is found , the
complexities or ministerial resignations and public opinion are explored and illuminated.
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INT RO DUCT IO N
Thisth.:sis isabout sub stantiw d.:mocra.: y. l'a rtiwlarlytowhat.:xt.:nt gowlllm.:nt
outp utsar.:i n llu.:n.:.:d by publi.:opinion. It is easy to ass ume that a co untry is dem ocrat icjust
beca use there arc free and fair ele cti ons. Some aca demics haw even defined dem ocracy by the
inst itution ofelections (Sc hump ctcr 1950 ). It is not to say that elections arc not essen tia l to
democracy, but arc they a sufficient co nd ition? Ilow about when the govc nunc nt is not eve n
directly elec ted? Th e answe r is not a simple yes or no. It dep end s on if a substa ntive measu re of
demo crac y exists. Substantiw d.:mocracy, a go v.:rnanc.:syst.:mthat.:mpow.:rsth.:populatio n,
ma y be crea ted thro ugh e lectio ns, but it cann ot simply be ass ume d that electio ns w ill create a
sub stan tive democrat ic state . The refore , some fund am en tal clem ent ofsubs tantive dem ocra cy
must be se lec ted and measured to dete rm ine if' the iust itutions of a co untry do in fact create
substantive democracy. Th ere has co nseque nt ly been a growing effort to measu re democracy.
Fora government to be tru ly democrat ic, ma ny sc ho la rs be lieve that itS outputs should
repre sent the articu lation ofthe publ ic will ( Rousseau 1762,M iIlI X6 1, Lijphartl9X4,and Dahl
2(00). T h.:rda tionship b.:tw.:.:n public opinionandgov.:rnm.:nt po licyoutputs has there fore
received co ns idera ble attentio n. Thi s bod y of r.:s.:archhas cr.:at.:d con sid.:rab k wnt row rsy
b.:cau s.:itr.:stsonth.:rath.:rdubiousassumptio ns that th.:pub licis:( I)knowkdg.:abk.:nough
to both form and co mm un icate linn opinions abou t government outputs and (2) respond 10
cha nges in government outputs. D.:spit .: th isd.:bat.:, att.:mptst od.:monstrat .: a r.:spon siv.:
gov.:rnm.:nt, r.:qui ring a r.:spons iw public. hav.: d.:t.:nn in.:d that in fact thc govcnuucnt doc s
r.:spo ndto publicopinion( Wk zi.:n I995 ;Stimso n, Mack u.:n,andE rickso n I995) . Howe ve r,
this r.:spon siw n.:ss shouidnolb.: ov.:rstat.:d. Itwould s.:.:m tha tr.:sp on siv.:n.:ss isnotth.:n orm,
butrath.:roccursulllkrc.:rtaincircumstanc.:s( Burst.:i n 2003) . Government outp uts tend to show
responsiveness to public opinion in issues that arc salient and require only simple analysis. That
should not be mistaken to only mean simple issues, but rathcr simpic responses. Wk zicn (19()5)
developed the thermostatic model of responsiveness which rcquired the public simply to desire
more or less spending in broad policy areas as opposed to specific issues requiring complex
responscs. LJnfortunatcly,a ll govcrnlllentac tivityca nnot be lllcasured in oroad spending
categorie s, The search flJrrc sponsivenessin othcr activities is alsorequircd.
Th e prim ary goal ofthis thesis is to attempt to identify government responsiveness to
public opinion in the resignation ofcabinet ministers as well as public responsiveness to cases
whcrclllini stcrsresignin Canada. This thesis seeks to probe a small, out novel, relationship
oetwccnpuolic opinion and governlllenta ction. lt is argued thatt hcrei s no responsiveness in
ministerial resignations in Canada; however, it is notcd that a lack ofobservations or lack ofu nit
homogcncitYlllaya ccountllJrthclack of signiticanceinthcfind ings. Furthcr. jr links thc
literatures ofdelll ocraticreprescntationandlllini sterialt urnover to address a broader concern in
dClllocratic govcrnancc:puoliccontrol ovcr rcprcsentativcb chaviOUL Lik c policy. thc
composition ofgovcmmcnt in Westminster democracies is not performed directly by the
clcctoratc tlranks 19S7). Instcad,ckcted representatives create thc govcrnment compositionlili'
the electorate much like the creation of policy is indirect through elected officia ls. This issue is
increasingly important as the government creates most legislation and oversees the
administration oft he government apparatus (Mallory 1( 71). Consequently, a democratic
governments houlda lsoi nd ude ana rticulationof thc public willi n thc composition oft he
government. Whereth cpuolicha sn o mcchanismt oen llJrcc the sek ction of cabinel lllinisters or
articulatet heirchoi ceofcan didates, thes tudy ofresponsivcness in government composition can
only be measured in the deselectionofministers. Thep ublic can calll lJrthe resignalionof
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cabinet ministers that they do not prefer, The government can therefore demonstrate
responsiveness by forcing the resignation ofc abinet ministers, Should responsiveness he found
int hcdc sclcetio nof cabinctmi nistcrs.i tca nbc saidt hatt hc public has some control overt he
choiccs of thosc whorcprcscnt thcm and crcatc policy on thcir bchalf.
Chaptcr l willd iscussthc importancc andnaturc ofrcsponsivcncss in representative
democracies. The plausibility of govcrnmcnt and public responsiveness will be discussed by
asscssing thc naturc of clitc bchaviour and the limits of public opinion. This chapter will also
pw vidc ahricf ovcrvicw ofti ndings conccrningrcsponsivcncss.whichl cadstothc sclcctionof
thermostatic responsiveness as the preferred mode l for this study. Chaptcr 2 will focus on the
development of thc Canadian political process and governing institutions which will identify the
mechanisms and individuals which will need to be explored when considcring thc dccision to
lllrcc acahinctrc signation int hc modcrn Canadianco ntcxt. An overviewo fmi nisterial
resignation literature will identify what data should be collected and how it should be coded to
cva luatc rcsponsivcncssi n ministcrial rcsignations.Finally. thcmcthodologyof Dcwan and
Dowding (2005) will be introduced as a substitute for measuring the impact ufpublic opinion on
ministerial rcsignationsa nd the impact ofth ese resignations on public opinion. Though the
methodology will not be identical, the results should act as a comparison with the nitcd
Kingdom where Dcwan and Dowding (2005) found rcsponsivcncss docsoccurinm inistcrial
resignat ions.
Chaptcr J and 4 pw vidc thc spccitic mcthodology and rcsults of this study. ChuptcrJ
includcs aqualitativc analysisoft hcrcs ignationo ft lJrlllcrLibcral Cabinet MinisterL awrence
MacAulay. This rcsignation providcsa nc xamplc thatc lcarlyi llustratcs public opinion
favouring the governing party dropping after a minister's scandal. then incrcnsing uftcrthc
minister resigned. It also highlights motives and constraints on resignations other than public
opininn fluctuations. Thisanalysisi sfiJllo\V<:dbyas<:ri<:sof variabksthataff<:ct r<:signations.
IIonour ratios. the number ofresignations divided by the total number ofresignation issucs.u re
calculated for each attribute of relevant variables to determine which variables arc significant.
Chapter 4 provides the Dewan and Dowding (2005) ordinary least squares regressions performed
on the Canadian case and a reverse regression to determine if public opinion affected
resignations . A discussion is included identi fying possible reasons why no responsiveness seems
to be present in ministerial resignations in Canada.
Thist h<:sisco nclud<:sthal th<:conc<:n trationof pow<:r tot h<:l'rim c Mini stcro f Cnnnda
may threaten the foundations ofi ndividual ministeria l responsibility. Ew n the public seems to
car<:v<:rylitt l<:aboutth<:activiti<:sofcabin<:tminist<:rs unkss th<:ya r<:involwdinsom<:s<:rious
scandal .
C II I - RESPO NSIVE ESS
The interre lationship of pub lic opi nion an d go vernment act ivity is cen tra l to functional
democracy. In d irect democracies, the instit utional rclationship bctwccn thc public und
gov ernment outpu ts is clear ; the pub lic makes gove rnance deci sion s. Unfortunately , modern
dem oc racies do not functi on so directl y: in the modem se nse. de mocracy refer s to repre sentat ive
democra cy (Lijphart 1994) . Thi s chapter will introduce the go ve rnme nt res pons iveness as the
measur e of substantive democrac y in repre sentative systems ofgovernmenl.A government
respon sive to pub lic opini on require s a public to be motivated and able to respo nd to government
act ion and agovernment that is motivated and ablc to respond to public opi nio n. Th is chapter
also demon strate s that these condi tio ns arc pos sib le. A literatl1l'ereviewonrespon sive nessthen
co ncl ndesthat the thermostatie mo del is bes tsuited for understand ing the eomplcx re lationship
betw een pub lic opinion and gov ernment outp ut. Th e the rmostat ic model thu s beco mes a
des irable tool fo r measurin g substantive democracy.
Responsive Representation and Substa ntive Democracy
Th e word dem ocra cy is deri ved from two route word s d eII/ O.\'and cratos. The se ancient
Greek word s mean people and pow er respecti vel y. Consequently the first usage of the word
democrac y refe rred to a system of gove rnance whereb y the pcople had thc public pow er. In the
time of ancie nt Athenian democracy, this mea nt direct dem ocracy. Each ind ividua l citize n who
had the time , interest , an d ca paci ty to partici pate in governance co uld go to thc puhlic squarc for
publ ic debate. Not onl y did the citizen vote on ever y major dec ision , but wa s a lso free to ful ly
take part in all majcr dclib crat ion s rManin 19')7) . The Athenians va lued their politica l equal ity
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so muc h that they fe lt it was be tte r to se lect public officia ls rand oml y by lot than to vot e. T hey
were co nce rned that e lectio ns wo uld enhance the pow er of the e lite . A fewoffices were se lected
by popular ele ct ion. bu t their tenur es were limi ted to prevent any ind ividua l fro m attaining long -
term power over others. If a cit ize n was bel ieve d to have acc umulated too mu ch powe r or
influ cncc. jhcn the pub lic co uld vote to have that cit izen ostraciz ed(Forsdyke2005) . T his meant
thai the c itize n had to leave At hens and the surro und ing co untrys ide for 10 yea rs. The
punishme nt for returnin g early was death .
Eve n in the most dem ocr atic of states. institut ion s were put in place to man age
democracy. For prac tica l reasons these inst itut ion s wcre chan ged. The ostraci sm was eventua lly
rem oved . more position s we re e lected and term s ofoffic e extended (Fors dy ke2005: Manin
1')lJ7). Thi s allow euh ighl y compet entpeople tohave increa sedintluence for the ben efit o ft he
whole sta te. Despit e the fact that At hens mad e these changes. rcprc scnrativc dem ocr acy was sti ll
nol co nsidered de mocracy at all (Aris to tle !'o /itics). Th e Rom an s used electi ons to select
politica l e lites. but they too se parate th is practi ce from the tcrm dcm ocracy. Despite the
antidemocratic se nt ime nt of the Rom an elite . modern electoral democrncics wcrc foun dcd wit h
elee tedrepres enta tiontofilc il itate de mocra cy( Ma ninllJlJ7). The mo dern rep resen tative
democracy is thus diff eren t than the anc ient ele ctora l dcm ocr acy or d ircct dcmocracy.
Th e separat ion of e lection and dem ocracy by an cient Atheni an s and Romans should call
into ques tion the dem oc rat ic natur e o f modern repre sentativ e dem ocracic s. No twithstand ing
varia tio nso f meaning ass oe iated with " libera l uemocr acy" . there remains a li muamenta l
componcnt oft hc rcrm dcmo cracy . That is. if repre sentative democracies are in fact democratic ,
then the representatives must so mehow simulate what the full puhlic wo uld havc othcrwisc donc:
the y must be respo nsive to publ ic op inion .
Pitkin(I')67)provide s anappropriateoutlayf llr variou s wnceptions of repr esenta tion
that have been propos ed by infl uentia l sc ho lars leadin g up to Pitk in 's timc. Most impor tantl y,
Pitkin highl igh ts that institu tion s ca nno t guaran tee perfec t rep resen tat ion , ne ither is
" representation" a concept that is easil y defined. However, throu ghout Pitkin's d iscu ssion of
issues releva nt to representatio n and the types and co mponents 0 I rep resent ation . so me ide as of
what is required for democrati c repr esent ation are ex plored and highlighted.
Institutionsarerequiredto filcilitatedemocraticdecisionmaking. None arc perfect .
Athenian direct dem ocracy was a ve ry close appro xima tio n except that it excluded a ll wome n,
minors, fore igners, and s laves (Manin 1(9 7). Further , those cit izens who co uld not a fford to
leave their work to attend countl ess public meetin gs were largely exc luded fi-OI11 all but the most
important debates. Repr esentati ve dem ocratic institutio ns face di fferent cha llenges. not the least
of which is Aristo tle's perspe cti ve that electi on s ca n only cre ate aristocracy or o liga rchy:
howe ver , throu gh their analysis there is room loroptimism conc ernin g subs tantive demo cra tic
represe ntatio n.
Pitk in (196 7) highli ght s the import anc e of author iza tion o f repr esen tati ves. This
form ali stic approach to und erstand ing representation requ ires little more than that.
Unfllrtunatd y, as astanda lone prine ipk of representation, having onl y ele ctio ns as an inst itut ion
to leg itimate repre sentati ves guarante esnothingmorethan aeon tinu ous parad c of
represe ntatives . The se repre sentati ves could ac t in any way they see fit betwe en d eetion s.This
hardly creates a substa ntive democracy: however electora l selec tion is preferable to self-
selection.
.lust as importa nt. Pitkin also highlights the developmen t of "standing for " those that arc
beingrepresentcu . Pilkinstalest hat lhiscanbesymbolicor descr iplivc . First.x ymbo lically
speaking, if a represenlalive looks like consliluenls, lhey may have enhanced legilimacy because
the represented feel a closer link to the ir representative , Furexumplc.u mcmbcrofu minoru y
group may feel better represented by a member ofthat group because Ihe representative acts asa
symbol fort he represented memb er. Descriptive represen tatio n, where the representative ' s
personal characleristics represenl lhecommon members ofa riding may also cnhanc c lcgitima cy.
l laving conunon characteristics means thai thc rcprcscnta tivc will likely have a common
cxpericnccand unuerstanding and lhuss harc intcrcsts which she can then bctter rcprcscnt at an
electoral asse mbly.
Pitk in further and more impnrtantly suggcsts thai representati ves shnuld vac t fur 't thosc
they represent; a capacit y that could be enhanced by descriptive rcprcscntat ion, but which holds
mure subsla ntiveimplicatio ns!llrrcpresentation. "Acting !l)r" necessitatcs action; lhat the
represe ntative acts on behalfo fth ose that are represented. This concept is not a simple one;
Pitkin goes to conside rable lengths to descr ibe the familie s of analo gies that exist 10 describe the
relationship ofacting! llra gro up. Sheconeludes,t houghs he does sowithcaveats. lhal lhe
representati ve must act in thc vinrcrcsts" of those that arc represented. This is not easy because
thereprcsented havc differenta nusometimescont1iclingi nterests . Further , one person is limited
in capacity und cannot fully represent even a single otherp erson. Thc gual of dcmoc rntic
institutio ns. acco rding 10 Pitkin, is to best faci l itate representation Ill!' the citizenry by the
rep resen tati ves. The institutions sho uld be chan ged in time to bett er serve thi s ideal .
Neve rtheless , there rema ins a significant debate over how the representat ive is best able to act till'
the represe nte d . Tlw r.:pr.:smtativ,: colild at t.:mp t todo wh atplibl ic opin ionf:lvour s or do what
the repre se ntat ive bel ieves is in the best interest ofthe pub lic . Thi s debate has bee n labell ed the
mandat e-i ndependence controversy and is ofte n attributed to Edm un d Burkcs 1770 Spccch !o
theEl ectorsofBristol .
After bein g ele cted to the British Parliament, Burkc o ffc rs a spccch to thosc who havc
ckctcdhim asthcirrcprcscntativctothc l lo liscof Commons . Hurkc di scusscs thc main
controv.:rsicssurro undi ng whatarcprcs .:ntativcsho uld do in l'a rl iam.:nt. l lccx p lainstha tt hc
repre sentati ve is respon sible to do w hat he thi nks is in the best intcrcsts ofthc co nstitucnts. T his
isbcca usc thc co nstitucnts havc sck ctcdsom.:onc w ho thcy think is part icularl y ab le to co nd uct
th.: irpll bl ic bu sin.:ss on thc irb.:hal f. If thc con sritucnt s d isagrcc wi th thc rcprc scn t.u ivc. jhc
represe ntative should still do w hat he deem s is mo st appropria te for thc publ ic f ll urkc 1770) .
Burk e chos e to tCJIIow his own opin ion s rather tha n the publ ic ' s when act ing as their
r.:prcs.:nta tiv':, thollghhc wasnot r.:-d .:ct .:d .
Since Burke , many infl uential scho lars incl udin g Rou ss.:all ( 1762), Mill (IX61) , Lijpha rt
(llJ X4). and Dahl (2000 ) indicate that demo cracy should inco rporate an articulation of publ ic
will. For a r.:prcscntativ.: dc mocracy to b,:s llbs tantivc ly d ':llIocratic th.:gov.:rnmcnt lllllst hc
resp on si ve to public opinion, Forthistobcth.:casc,th.: governlllcntlllusth.:abktoknowthc
pu bl ic 's aggrcgat.: pretc r.:nccs an d bc motivat.:dto act accord ing to those preferences .
Precond itions ofRes ponsiveness
If we accept that representative democracy should prod uce a govcrnmcnt that is
respo nsive to publ ic wi ll. pub lic sent imen t, pub lic opi nio n or sorne such phr ase, then we should
explore if andhowa governmentactsrespon sivel ytopublieopinion . The Iirst step is to expl ore
the basic components o f res ponsi ve government. Elected repre sentatives must be motivat ed and
able to res po nd to publ ic opinion. The publi c in turn must have preferences or o pinions that a rc
stable , rational and can change g iven new infonnat ion. lfc ithcr ofthcsc cri tcria cnnnot be met.
then respon sive nes s cannot exist and any co variation ofpublic opi nion and government output
must be driven by some other var iable or co inc idence . Represe ntative behavio ur and pub lic
opinion will thus be explored .
Rep resent ative Behaviour
Diseussionsofel itebehaviourhavebeen eommon sinee the time o fthe anci ent Greek
philo sophers. These discu ssio ns were mostly normative co nsid cra tio ns abo ut how elites should
act and the potenti al consequences of these actions on the state. T hese earl y scholars suc h as
Socrates (T he Republic ) and later durin g the Renai ssance, Machi avelli (The Princ e) , rel ied on
analogy and histor ical exa mples to dem onst rate wh y ruler s sho uld rnakc dcc isions in vario us
ways that refle cted the need s of the polit y. The se normati ve based arguments, tho ugh they
so me times discu ssed democracy, by no mean s included the need for formal mechani sm s to
en sure the rulers behaved this way . T hey s imply ind icated tha t if interests were not scrvcd. jhc u
the polit y or leaders wo uld suffer. Later scho lars who considered the role of the represe ntative .
such as Burk e ( 1770) and Pitkin ( 19( 7), addre ssed these co ncerns in thei r work s. T hese work s
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continued to lack a theoretical framework that described why elites would behave in a way
beneficia l to the public that could be empirically verified. Downs' An Economic T!l cO':I' or
f)CII10 (T(/( :1' ( 1957) was an curly attempt to make the change from normarive analysis to
empirical. The result was a seminal addition of economic theory to political scicncc.
The Economic Theor y of Democracy proposed by Downs (1957) is both deducti ve and
positive. Unlike the more normative models that preceded it. this model focuses on what elites
do and why. instead of what they should do and why. As well. it provides a testable theory that
can be falsifie d, As Downs admits, there are some problems with the assumptions. These
problems are in largcpart crcated bceause economic thcorics of'bchaviourarc hcavily simplificd.
Thercsulti sa eons iderable inerease inp arsimonyattheex pcnseofex planatory power. The
discussiono frep resenta tivcbehaviourt hat ti.Jllowslargclyce ntresonrat ionalehoicctheories
because elites tend to have the incentive and capacity to act rationally in pursnit ofthe ir interests.
Psychological and cognitive theories which often challenge rationa l choice theories also tend to
ident ify elites as those most capable of acting rationall y and in a self-interested way ' . In the later
section concerning public opinion. rational choicc cxplanatio ns will bc complcmcntcd with a
greater inclusion of psychological and cognitive theories to dctcnninc the plausibilit y of public
responsiveness.
Economics theories require thc assumprion that individuals are motivated to pursue their
interests rationall y. That is. they are able to choose a preference or rank order pre ferences in a
series of alternatives. Further. as resources arc scarce. individuals not only pursue that which
they seek to maximize. but also minimize their costs. Thus preferences arc maximized and costs
' Thes e l heories are d iscussed in l he Public Opinio ns ecl io n la le r in l his chapte r.
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minimized (F lanagan I<J<JX). If theprcferenee whi eh is sou ght to be maximized ean be
iden tifi ed, the n the mean s by which a rationa l actor will att empt to maxim ize that preference can
be identifi ed. Downs app lies th is to government by ass umi ng that dem ocra tic electora l
gove rnments wa nt to maximi ze pub lic sup po rt. In the co ntex t of modern represent ative
democrac ies, par ties mu st a lso be co nside red. Dow ns assumes that the goa l ofa gov crn ing purt y
is to ga in re-e lec tion and the goa l of opposition parties is to f0I111 gove rnme nt. Eac h party seeks
to maxim ize public support. Parties arc there fore seen to produ ce po licy as a mca ns to win
ele ct ions rather than winning electi ons to produce pol icy ( Downs 1<J57).
So me have que stioned the notion that indi vidu als arc highl y rat ionul.wi th xct ordcrs of
prefere nces. and that they a lso have the capac ity to logicall y orga nizc co mpeting ideas (Co nverse
I<J64). Psycholog ists and cognitive sc ientists have spent considcr ablc cffo rt unde rsta ndin g what
hasbeentermed 'bo undedratio na lity' . lnancfflJ rt to reduce thecosts of dec ision making,
humansrely onintcllcctual decisionmakin g short cuts cal ledheuri stics (l' opk inl()<JI ).llmvcvcr ,
there is more ev ide nce that clit esare particularlyadepta tfulti lling the ir ratio na l choice
expectations. Even Converse ( 1()64) ide nti fied that educate d e lites tend to ho ld interna lly
co here nt sys tems ofbeliefs and arc able to abst ractly eva luate new infon nation and ideas in
terms of their pre-existin g prefe rences. Po litical el ite arc there fore ab le to prop ose po licy that is
ratio na lly determi ned to be more favoura ble for re-e lection tha n alt ernative po licies that may be
seen us be tte r for soci ety.
Despi te the tac t that ma ny scho lars have fou nd rational cho ice ex planations for e lite and
government beh avi our to be va luable, the parsim ony co mes wi th a loss 0fcx planatory pow cr
whic h g ives rise to exc eptions (Lupi a, Mct.u bbins, and I'opkin 2( 00). One such except ion that
has brought about incrcascd attcntionto clitcbchaviouri s minority govcmmcnts in
parliamentary systems. Given that in a minority government. the opposition's combined strength
cxcccdsthcmajorityofthc pariiamcnt,i tis uncicar whyt hcsc partics do notl i.m:ca ni mmcdiatc
election to mount a new attempt at achieving government. Strom ( llJlJO)re-examines the
motivcs ofoppositionpartics andi sablcto cxplainthisb y cxpandingth cirmax imandst oincludc
office and policy concessions. Assuch, hc argucs that many particsarc wclla warct hat thcy
cannot obtain government and thlls thcsc sccond ordcrp rcfcrcnccs arc atta inable through
minor ity govcrn mcntorcoalition. Thc minority govcmmcnti ntu m has lostoll to nachanccto
form a coalition and ensure stable government with some concessions. Strom again determ ines
that this is due to rational future electoral motivation. Minority governments arc often able to
perform well, though they arc less durable than coalitions or majority governments. Most
importa ntly.mi nority govcrnm cnts tcnd tooll tpcrti.mllt hcircoali tiona ltcrnativcs inthcir next
election. Minority governments are thus acting as rational choice theories would expect them to,
blltllnd cr certaininstitlltional constraints and condi tions.
Despite the exceptions to rationa l choicc cxpcctatio ns ofclitc bchaviour addrcsscd hy
Strom ( llJlJO),thecli tesof political parties do not always seem to behave in ways that maximize
public sllpportti.lrth eirparties. Scparatingpartybehaviourfromthebehaviour ofthecl ites that
lead the parties is necessa ry to better understand why thcird ccisions sornctimcs docs not appcar
tobe simplyp llblic sllpport maximizatio n. Advocatesof policyrcsponsivcncss understand that
the government produces outputs that do not always serve to maximize public support (Soroka
andW lezicn2 0 10). This too can be understood when considering the complcxit ics ofmotivcs
facing political elites in governing parties. l' rincipnl-agcncy thcory. also known as agency
th.:ory.isamod.:lingt.:.:hniq u.: import.:dfrom.:wnomicswhichsh.:ds ligh t on the co nflictin g
motivcs ofpol itical .:lit .:s. sp.:cificall yth.:kad.:r o fth .: govnning party (Mi lb2005).
Ag.:ncyth.:ory.lik.:th.:r.:stofrationa lchoic.:t h.:ori.:s.isd.:riv.:d from eco nomics.
Spec ifica lly it co ncer ns the relat ion ship between a princ ipal whoprovidcs co mpc nsa tio n to an
age nt who per forms some sor t ofservice on the princip als bchal f' {Milkr2(05) . ln th.:cas.:of
repre sen tative democracy. ind ividua ls run in compcti tivc clcctio ns for a govcrnmcnt otficc. In
.:xc hang.: filr pr.:st ig.:.comp.:nsation.and pow.:r. th.:s.:i nd ividuals(ag.:nts ) provi d.:s.: rvic .:s lilr
the public (pri ncipal) . Opponents perfo rm a monitoring function by brin ging to light the
shortcomings ofthose elected , Th is help s prevent shirking ofagent res po ns ibilities (Laver
1( 9 1). Most democracies require a gro up of individua ls that arc e lecte d or runni ng for electio n
to usscmb lc as u po litica l party. If tog.:tlwr th.:y ltJrlll gov.:rnm .:nt.th.:n th.:y spl it th.: r.:wards
andth.:r.:s po ns ibiliti.:sof thatag.:ncy . In practice this norm all y r.:qu ir.:sth.: s.:k ction of a
leadership group from withi n the party to actually form the gove rnment (Lave r 1(91). Thi s
leade rship group is in turn the prim ary ag ent to thc c lccro ratc and thc ag cut to thc part y us a
whole . Asa result policies offered arc chose n in an effor t to satisfy bo th 0 I these princ ipals in
.:xc hang.: lill·continuingto ho ld th.:ot1ic.: .
To remai n in government. the leadership of the governing party must an ticipate future
e lectoral reprisa ls ifth ey fail to provide popular outputs. Co nseque ntly, government may be
expec ted to co nsult heavily with public opin ion when produ cin g policy output s. es pecia lly in
sa lient issues or issues that threate n to become salie nt ifhandle d poorly ( Burstei n 200J). The
leadership must a lso provide outputs that arc favourable to the par ty as a who lc. This normall y
invo lwsabalanc.:ofoutputsthatrdkctsth.:int.:r.:stsofits m.:mb.:rs hipandwill not threat en
loss of government in the next elec tion (Laver and Shcps lc 1996). Th is balance can be difficult,
buta gove rnmentt hatproduces popularo utputst hat maxi mizei tspublics upportis unlikelyto
lose its party support as a result. Continued governing by the party is usually populara mongst its
memhership. lt guaranteesgreaterc apacity!l) ro utputs !:lvourablc !ot hemespccially on
nonsa licnt issues. Consequently. a gove rnment can be expected to produce outputs that are
responsive to public op inion and still behave ina highly sc l f- intcrested way .
The governing party and the elites who run it have ample motive to he responsive to the
public ifi n! :lctthe puhlicwill he responsive lot hciractions. Furthcr. jhc govcmmcnt has thc
resources necessary to indcnti fy aggrcgatc public opinion and public opinion changes. This
informa rion can be communicated to the government rather easi ly through nutional mcdiapubl ic
opinion polls. or direct comm unication from members ofthe pub lic (Soroka and Wlczicu Ju lu) .
It is. however. not enou gh for the government to respond to public opinion. The public
must also have rationa l prefere nces that are responsive to the gove rnment 's actions. They must
be aware of what the government is doing and change thcir prct ercnccs uccordingly . The
public' s ability to meet these demand s is more questionable than thc govcrmuc nts. The
discussion ofp ublic opinion will consider rational choicc thcorics.Lut also focus morc hcavily
on psychologica l and cognit ive theories ofbehaviour because they call into question the public 's
capacity to act respon sivel y to government output.
l' ublic Opinion
It would be desirable to be able to state that the public either docs or docs not have the
capacity torcspond to govcrnlllcnta etions. lnstcad,i ts ccllls as if thc public docs havc this
capacity,butwith anulllbcr of scriousl illlitations.T obcttcrundcrstand when and where a public
is likely to be responsive to government activity. it is essential to understand how the public
makes and changes its preferences and attitudes.
To review Downs( 1957),e ach individuals houldactinawayt hatisboth rational and
self- interested. Though Downs focuses on voter choice, the logic of the public ' s decisions
should not change between elections when asked who they would support. Each individual
should consider the actions ofgovernment and support the governing party when it acts in a way
that favours her own interests. Unfo rtunately . information is limited and can be costly to acquire.
Each individual , when considering their party support must cons idcr two countcracting facrors.
First.thepotentialbe ndi tsof their aetions. The level of support that an individual can muster.
one vole, is almost too small to ever have a significant effect. The second. the cost of accurately
choosing which party supports the individual' s interests can be high. Acquirin g and
understanding allth eparties' policies and plat ti.JrI11s. gainingth e understand ing of the
implications to the individual and finally evaluating the follow through is costly. Dowlls ( 1957)
suggests that the individual lllelllber of the public thus rclies on a nUlllber of lllechanisllls to
redueethecostofobtainingi nfi.lllllation. First,t helllos tr clevantinti.JrI11ationisselectedb y
political parties.i nterest groups and lllediati.lr distribution.Second,itis translllittedti.l r iowcost
through pay and free media. Thirdrhcrc arc a number of individuals and groups that will
analyse it and provide the results. Even the decision to interpret what results are desirable is
simplified through the usc of ideologies: that is, simplifi cd abstractions of what would a good
society is and what it takes to create it (Downs 1( 57).
Unfortunately, Downs' <opr imistic cvaluation has been called into question. pcrhaps most
pointedly by the concept of the voter paradox. Even in the event of an election when the public
has the most influence in government, the weight of cost and benefi t of voting seems to indicate
that a rational individual would never put any time into voting choiccs, Despite the lowered cost
ofi nformation. the actual weight of one vote in deciding a reproscntativc. Jct ulouc in
determining policy output is so small that no effort is justified (Blais 2( 00). Despite this fact,
many individuals still vote. This seemingly irrational choice calls into question the public' s
ability to behave rationally. An exploration of psychological and cognitive cxplanations ufpuhlic
opinion and behaviour may help to determine if the public can act responsivcly tu govcrnmcut
activity.
Psychological theories apply particularly well to individuals and in types of aggregate
behaviour like voting (Easton 19(5). Converse ( 1964) has demonstrated that people hold beliefs
which arc not logically consistent with either their interests orothcr rclutcd bclicfs. Though this
may not be true of all pcoplc. Convcrsc dcmon stratcs th.u somc pcoplc arc morc susccptihlc to
idiosyncratic beliefs than others. Unfortunately for the public who rely on political elites to
control the government, they arc the most likcly twith somc cxccprions) to hold logically
inconsistent beliefs and beliefs that do not reflect their self-interest. Converse ( 1964) explains
that this is due to lowered access to information and education. Though there arc considerable
ways in which individualsca naccess inflll"Jna tiona nd improve theira bility tovote fora party
that most closely reflects their preferences, Converse and Easton's findings seriously cast a
shadow on the usc of economi c model s to understand mass preference s and voting pattern s. In
fact Converse claimed that when answering questions on prefe rence. nearly XO'Yt, of Ame ricans
seemed to generate an opinion on the spot. l lc termed such instances"nonattitudes" .
If up to XO'% of citizensdemonstraten onatt itudes. then 20'Y., have valid altitudes and
preference s. Many of the earlier psycho logical theorie s were equally as pessimistic about the
public ·s capacities.Theyti.lCussedon individuald ifte rencesandhow they attr ibute attitude
forma tio n and persuasion (Cacioppo and Petty 19X2). Th is group of theor ies also leads to the
conclusion that the public cannot be respo nsive to govc mmcnt outputs. There is a difficul ty with
understanding altitude formation and persuasion as unique to each individual; that is ite very
individual is fundamcntally diffcrc nttbcn how can aggregate responsivcncss ota popu lation be
understood predictabl y by politi cal elites? Parties would be forced to compete using random
prom ises of outputs and j ust hope that they arc congruent with the random prefer ences of some
large group ofvoters, Outputs would no longer be ideological or rationa l, but rather an eclect ic
random mix of policy. Fortunately, though individual differe nces arc pro nounced and comple x.
politica lps ychologists have managedtoli nd important di tkrences thatcan be understooda nd
categorized.
Newman ( 19X6) proposed the Three Component Model of public sophistication. The
three categories arc salience. knowledge. und conccptual ization. These fact or s taken together
determ ine to what extent an individual is capable of making sophisticatcd assess ments of policies
and other government outpu ts. The higher up this scale. the more likely an indiv idua l will act as
rational choice suggests . This model interestingly highlights similar characteris tics to Petty and
Cacioppo (1')X6)dual-process model of persuasion. Pcu y und Cacioppos modcl suggests that
indi vidua ls who have both the ability and moti vati on arc prone to usc what thcy tcnn the cent ra l
route to pe rsuasion. Th at is. they rely on the content o f arguments to form or change thc ir
attitu de on apartieular issue .\Vhen individuals arenotable ormotivated . they rely on simple
heu ristics or cues to form their o pinions . Th e selec tion of route is not entir ely based on
indivi dua l di ffer ences that arc lon g lastin g. but rat her route selec tion is decid ed by ind ividua ls on
an issuc-hy -issuc basis. This disti nct ion is impo rtant bccu usc thc quali ty oti nfonna tionava ilahle
to the publ ic ma y determin e whethe r or not the public has thc ca puci ty to sc lcc t attitudc s o r
pre ferenc es rationa lly. It a lso makes the distin cti on that sa lient issues will bring ahoutration al
dec is ion makin g in a wa y that non salicnt issues will not. These d ist inctions will become
imp orta nt when considering the qu alit y and availabilityof intl mu at ion d isscminatcd th rough the
medi a.
Furthe r. Page and Shapiro ( 1992) offer a response to earlier c la ims of an irrationa l publ ic,
speei fk a llyConverse·s nonattitudes. Their ti nd ings. based on survey resear ch . brin g the
exp erim Cllta l bas ed wor kofNewman ( 19X6j.and Petty and Cacio ppo ( 19X6j toaellla l rea l wo rld
fi nd ings . It wa s found tha t the survey de sign of man y ea rlier scholars led to wnsidcrublc crror
rather tha n mea suring rando m fluct uatio ns in pub lic opinion. T hese error s ranged from
ambiguity in tllreed cho ieeanswers. w ns iderahle key punehing responseerrors.a nd the pressure
of the test -like survey s ituation. Later researc h correct ed for these error s and found promising
result s for a publi c that bas rat ion al and stable attitudes and prct crcnccs. Th rough very
co mprehens ive ana lysis of other scholars' findings . the ana lys is o f a large dataset of publ ic
op inio n onavariclyo f iss ues.anda fl1Cuson many releva ntf :lCtors. Page and Shapiro ( 1992)
found optimistic conc lusions co ncern ing the publ ic ' s aggre gate ability to meet the need s o f
responsiven ess. The publ ic. they found, have rea l and co herent preferences whi ch arc stable. but
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chan ge in undcrs tandablea nd predictablcways. These opinions reflect their sense of the public
good and their own interests . Page and Sha piro do warn howeve r that these opinions are not
ideal. The public is susceptible to not noticing issues that are not salient. The publ ic may also
be misled by government. and do not always contemplate a large varietyofa lternatives .
Later criticisms of Page and Shapiro ( llJlJ2) have demonstrated weakncs scs in thcirwork .
Kuklinski and Quir k (2000) found that the public rely heavil y on the use of heuristics such as
framin g and cues to form their opinions. These frames and cues are norma lly disseminated to
the public through national media whic h lacks the capacity to provide high ly descriptive
ana lysis. These information short cuts make the public susceptible to manipulationandthus
potentia lly unab le to crea te their rational self-interest, Tho ugh this criticism is valid.
responsivene ss only requires that the public respond s to governmcnt action. not that it respond s
in a way that systematically favours the major ity.
The aforementioned findings indicate that a public can be respon sive. but only when
ci tizens are motivated to pay attention to an issue and qual ity informatiun on thc issuc is
avai lable. simplified, and accurate. Though promising. many of these ncccssary prccondit ious
requirethatthemediaprovidethe righti nfiJrlnationaboutissuest hatwilicaplllrethepublic ' s
attention and thus create saliency. Failing this. the public cannot be expec ted to be respon sive.
Though not mentioned to this point. there is also a componcnt ofr he magnitudeofan issuet hat
mustbemettostimulate thepublic ·sinteresti ne ngagingit.Stimson ( ll)lJl) propo ses that a
zone of acquiesce nce exists on a traditional pol icy dimension. So long as policies 1:\11within this
zone. the public largely does not believe that change is required . On the other hand when current
polic y falls outside of this range. either through changes in policy output or change in the
boundaries oft he zone ofacquiesc ence range , then the publ ic increas ingly dem and s eit her more
orlcssoutput in thatpolicy domain.Consc qucntly. public opinion may only influ ence po licy
outputs when the difference between publi c preference and actua l outp ut is udcq uatc ly lnrgc and
noticeable,
Th e publi c it would see m isalsomoti vatcd and ablctobcrcspon sivc. Unlike the
govcrnmcnt whichgcts its in l"lJnn ation through mcans such as polling. thc public must recei ve its
inliJrlna tionaboutgovcrnmcnt activitythro ugha morccomplcx rout e . T he medi a is most
rcsp onsiblc filr scndin g infiJnnati ontothcpublicabout govcrnmcntactivit icsand chan gcsin
gove rnment ou tputs. Thccomplcxi ticsofthcsc s igna ls must a lso be co nsidered to ensure the
info rmatio n is ava ilable in a useful format forthe public to rcspoud to .
Signals to the Publi c
Import an t issu es a rc brou ght to most pcop lcs attcntion throu gh the media . Howe ver,
intcrp rctat ionisalsorcquircd sothatmcmbcr softhc pub lic ca ncontcx tua lizcthclooscl:lctsthat
arc presented to them (S hapiro 1991\). T he media in turn mu st a lso pro vide interp retat ions o f
facts to the publi c . It is impor tant thcn to undcrstand how this in l"lJnllation is d isscminatcd
through the med ia and how the publ ic may res pond to these s igna ls. Thou gh mos t scho la rs have
idc ntilic d thatsomcsmall minor ityof thcpopulation wi ll producc hig hly inform ed and rat ion al
o pinions bascd on adcquatc infiJrlnation. thcrcst. who makc up thc bulk ofthc agg rcg.uc publ ic
opi nio n. will creat e their opinio ns in a differen t way.
l'ereeptions of cred ibility are very impoI1ant whenindi vidual s rely on the media lilr
in fonnation and intcrprctarion. Thi sh eur ist iehclps individuals todeeipher whatinterpreta lions
should hea llowed toalter thcir attitudes. l'ageandShapiro ( 1992) tilllndt hat commentaries hy
jo urna lists and exper ts were the most persuasive sources of inlim nation in the media. Thou gh
the reasonsliJrthe enhaneed persuasivenesso fjo urnalists in particu larcould heamhiguous.
these two groups are often seen as unbiased and competent which are charactcristics highly
importa nt to persuasio n. Gove rning and oppositio n parties were found to he considerab ly lcss
persuasive. This too makes sense because their biases and personal motives are well known.
They must rely on other mechani sms to persuade the public that their policics or part y arc corrcct
and worth supporting or that their competition is not. In Downs' parlance. this would increase
the expected party differential between gove rning party and opposition party and thus incrca sc
the likelihood that voters will abstai n from voting for thc oppoucnt or changc thcir votc
altogether.
Outside of issue publics and elites, the general public requ ires inf orm .uion disscmin .u ion
from opinion lcadcrs t l.uzarsfcld and Katz 1(55) or through simplifi ed messages dissemin ated
through the media . The focu s in this study is the latter. If the public generally uses heuri stics in
their attitude fonna tionand persuasion. then it is important to understand how governing part ies
andoppositionpartiesattem pttoeffeetivcly use heurist iesi nl hemedia.\Vheretheyarealready
considcredhiasedand not persuas ivcon theirownmeritsassoureesof comm unication( l'ageand
Shapiro l ')()2). then theeontentof themessageis importa nt tounderstand.
The framing ofi ssues isa predominant and effective tool in this regard to help the pub lic
understand complex and competing issucs tShapiro 199X). Framing effects occurw hen an issue
isdi scu sscdinthecontextofothcrconsidcrations. Thcissucis cmh cdtkdinconsidcrat ionof
some thing else. For example, if a hate group rall y is de scribed in tcnn s offrccdom of speech, it
sho uld ga in more support than i fi t is des cribe d in terms of puhlie safety (Nelso n. Clawson, and
Oxley 1997). Theelieitat ionof opinions con cernin gthe valueorfreedomof speech cause
incr eased support wherea s elicitation of the dan ger of hate groups to public safet y reduced it.
Fram es are an important yet concerni ng too l for persuasio n. O n one ha nd,properl y framed
issue s pro vide the right infor mation so that indi viduals who know little about an issue ca n
co ntcxtualizc it and tit it in the ir be tter de ve loped more genera l be liefsyste ms . Unfortunate ly.
when leveraged excl usiv e ly for persuasive reaso ns , framcs ca u bc uscd to man ipulatc disc ussio ns
on issues and persuad e ind ividua ls from their ratio nal preference( Kuk linsk ia ndQuirk2002) .
Framingeftect sareso powerfi ilt hattheyareconsidere dto heoneofthe ce ntra l mean s of e lite
infl uence (Druckman and Nelso n 2(03) . The prom ine nce and effec tive ness of frames has thus
caused co ncern that subs tantive de mocrat ic theor y whic h rests on the articulation ofprefere nces
is threatened by mau ipulat ivc rhetoric ( Page and Shapiro 1992: Kuklinski and Quirk 2( 02) .
Experimental research on framin g effects has thus prolifera ted. The nature and effe ct of
frames has gained serious attention. Becau se most inve stigation concerning frame s hasheen
ex pe rimenta l, there has been conc ern for the external va lid ity ofthetindings. Chongand
Dru ckman (200 7) demon strated that in co mpctitiv c con tcxtsv strongcr frumcs wcrc morc
persuas ive tha n weaker ones and repe tition had no impact afte r ex pos urc to com pcti ng lramc s.
l lowcvcr.j t should bc nntcd that framing is not an all po werf ul lim n or pers uasio n.
Dru ckm an and Nclson(2003 ) lillllld thatthc efte cts o r com petin g cl iterhctori c arc
negate d by conv ersa tions wi th other who hold di fferin g po ints o lvi cw . This lind ingis
particularlyimportantassalicnt issucsa ndparticularly thoscrclcvanta tclcctionti mc will bc
suhjccttopuhlic discussio n.Framcsalsolacksignificantcffcct whcna nissucisofgrcat pcrsonal
importancctothc rccipicnts( l'r icc.N ira ndCappclla2005)and whcn the source is not perce ived
as credible (ilartma n and Wchcr 200'l ). These findings drawattention to the importance of
politicalparticsassourccso ffr amcsand how thc puhlic mayrcccivcthcsc lramcs. Siothuusand
dc Vrcese (2010) found that party sponsorship muttered on frames that were confl ict issues
between parties. An individual who identities with a party will exhibit a greater framing effect if
a framc is gcncratcd from thut party and will not be al"tCcted hy frames ofo ther parties.U nlcss
on consensus issues . Those who are not strongly attached toa political party should not be as
effected by the source of the argument and more likely to be affected by thc contcnt. So framing
is most inlluential on voters who are most likely to be willing to change their party preferences at
election time.
To conclude. the public does appear to have the capacity to be responsive to government
activities . Through informatio n disseminated by the media. simplified through heuristics. and
verified through public discussio n. the public as an aggregate can decide ifi ts preferences are
metorncedtobechangedi no ne dircct iono ra nother. lt is howeverimportant torc mcmber that
for the public to be responsive to government activities. these activi ties must concern salient
issues that have been communicated through mediated sources and that arc preferably simp listic.
Responsiveness
Scholarly Findings
The public and their repre sentatives both seem to have the capac ity to respond to the
action s ofone another, when certain conditio ns arc met. Respon siveness is thus plausible.
Scholarl y work on the opinion-policy relationship has also generated some positive results. This
literature is diverse and demonstrates that opinion docs aff ect policy, but again only under
certain conditions.
lndircct methods have been used to suggest that representative democracy docs includc
an articulation of the public will. A numbe r of scholars have considered the relation ship between
public opinion and party/representative rhetor ic or the content ofpo licy document s (Cohen 199'):
Rottinghaus 2(06). Though a positive relatio nship between the two seems to reflect the impact of
public opinion government activities . this may not be the ease. All this demonstrates is that the
gove rnment is in fact able to unde rstand what the public may want. but it does not mean the
government will do it. This relation ship may only be as deep as rhetori c.
Olher seholars have tilCussedoncomparing attitudes of publieallyeleeted official s and
public opinion. Again. a positive relationship was fo und t Vcrba and Nic 1972: Il ili and Il inton-
Anderso n 1995). However. it is important to note that sharing common opinions does not equate
acting on them. Weissberg ( 197X)has identified that in the United States. representatives do in
fac t vote in ways similar to the preferences of their constituents. Thi s relationship is known as
dyadic rcprcscnt.u ion. Thou gh thepresenceofdyadierepresentation supportsa substant ive
element to representat ive democrac y, it does not guarantee that the actions of government will in
fact be responsive to the public ' s opinions. Th is problem is particular ly relevant when
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co nsilkringthcopinio n-po licy rc lations hip in systcms whcrc thc rc is heavy party co ntro l over
vot ing. In Ca nada forexampl e, repr esen tatives vote accor d ing to pa rty lines, those that do not
can be rem oved from the cauc us (Sa vo ie 20 10 ). Dyad ic voti ng wo uld not be likely in such
systems.
Othe rs have found , suc h as Shapiro and Pagc(I') li3) ,thatbcyonddyadicvoting thc rc isa
corre lation betwee n public opinion and pol icy outputs (Soroka and Wlczicn 2( 07). Dcspitc thc
cov ar iat ion of polic y outputs and public opin ion. when assessi ng the relat ionsh ip be twee n two
variabl es. it is impor tant nut to mistake co rre latio n for ca usa tio n. Th e dem ocratic respons ive ness
mode l requires that poli cy mak ers must be rece ptive to changes in publi c opinion, through
intere st g roups. politi cal part ies, opinio n polling. or other d irect co mm unica tio n (Petry 1991 ;
Man za and Co ok 2002). One !~Ictorthatcou ld causc acorrc l ationbctwccnpuhlic op in ion and
polic y output is that thro ugh regular e lecti ons. new electe d offici als replace o ld oncs who se
opinions arc no longercongru ent with the electo rates . As such. responsiveness is not moti vat ed
by changes in publ ic op inion. but throu gh rcplaccmcnts ofclcctc d officiu ls. Bartcls ( 1991 ) found
that inthc United Stares Co ngress , on issues ofd efence spend ing that without much turnoveri n
c lcc tcd ofli c ia ls thc rc was acons idcrabk co rrcs pondcncc bctwccn public opinion change am i
po licy outputs change . This co nc lusion suppor ts respon sive elected repres entatives .
Furt her , po licy rcspon s ivcncsshas bccn cstabl ishcd in the Unitcd States, Canada.
(fc rmany.aud a numhcrof othcrcountrics( Burstc in2003 ). Po licy res ponsiveness has also bccn
found ina varictyof U.S . insti tutio ns incl uding Congress. the Presiden cy. and even the j ud iciary
and across dom ain s (St imson, Mackucn .und Erickson 1')<)5; Burstcin 2(0 3) . O fe qua l
importancc!l)ridc ntifyingacausa lrclat ion shi p.thc rcspo nsivcncssof rcprcsc nta tivcstcnds to
followtrend s in public opinion that fluctuate temporall y at the same pace as thc rcprc scntati vcs
electoral cycle. Elected officia ls, with shortertenures in office, arc more responsivc to short-
tcrm lluc tuations in publicopinion.Courtju dgcs.who havc scvc n-ycartcrms.tcnd to rcspond
more slowly and to longer-te rm trends in public opinio n changc jStimsonMack ucn and Erikson
1995).
A morc compclling piccc of cv idcncc tosupport thc causal rclation sh ip bctwccn puhlic
op inionand govcrnll1cntactivityisdctcrll1inin glcmpora lprcccdcncc. lfpuhlicopinionisto
causc a changcinpolicyoutpul.thcnt hc changc inpub licopinionmustprcccdcthc chan gcin
policyo utpUl. lf govcrnmc ntactionwcrc to changcpuhlicopinion. thcn thctcmpora l dircction
would be reversed , Time series regressio n analysis has demonstrated that puhlic opinion changc
docs int;lct occurpriortothc chan gcsin govcrnmcnloutpul. Many studic s(SorokaandWlczicn
2( 10)us ct his timllof rcgrcss ion whcrchy thc corrclation of two varia hlcsismcasurcd witha
time lag~ .
Thc conunon thcorc tical argumcn t leveraged is that elected officia ls respo nd to changes
in public opinion duct o thc anlicipation oftilturc clcctoral conscqucnccs j SrimsonMack ucn.
and Erickson 1995; Wlczicn I995) . This relationship stands to reason only if thc clcctoratc in
turn responds to govern ment output s. As outlined in thc public opinion section, there is dcbatc
concerning the public' s capacity to do so. Burstcin (2003) warns that responsiveness is not thc
norm. but is only evident sometimes, Soro ka and Wlczicn (20 10) also acknowled ge that three
factors must be considered to understa nd how public rcsponsivcncss may work and whcn. II
may work because only a small numbcr of individualsn ccdto chan gc thciropiuions to ruovc
' Time lags for opinio n-po licy relat ion ship s are generally 3 mo nt hs unl ess gove rn me nt out put requ ires a greater
perio d of tim e to im plemenl.
aggregate public support or opinion , politicians usc heuristics such us framin g and cues to help
simplify issues forthe public, and the public only need to focu s on a limited numbcr ofruajor
issues which become salient. That is, responsiveness on policy issues can occur, but only when
the public cares ,
Without public rcsponsivcncss, politicians havc no inccntivctofollow public opinion.
Consequently, for opinion to infl uence policy outputs, policy output s must in turn produce
changes in public opinion. Thcscchangcs musta lsocorrcspond with thc dircction and
magnitudcofthc changcsofthcpolicyou tput. That is, ifthe public wants an output and gets it.
the public must show some fon n ofsatis fuctio n with this outcome and somc form of
dissatisillction if thcydonotrcccivcit. The flow ofinformation in turn must run from the public
to the government and from the government to the public. Hoth must rcspond.
Th e Thermostati c Mode l
The Thermostatic Model of Responsiveness provides a comprehensive model which
takes into account all thc allJrcmcntioncdrcquircmcnlsofrcsponsivcncss. It also works given
thcrc strictionsplaccdo nc litc andp ublicrat ionality. Conscqucntly,t hcl11cthodsofthist hcsis
will be based on thc Thcrmo stutic Model. lts dcscriptio n fo llows.
Therm ostatic Responsiveness. a model first proposed by Wlczicn ( 1995), is the 1110st
compk tc modelof rcsponsivcncss cllITcntly in llsc. First,pllb licopinionona ni ssllc canbc
lIndcrstoodas normally distribu tcd notu nlikc[)owns' undcrsta ndingof thcmcd ianvo tcr. Thc
median is known as the ideal point of policy preferenc e on the given issue. This point is located
on a thermometer ofoutput . Like policy preference.actual policy output can also be placed on
the same thermometer. Themagnitudeanddirect ionofdiftercnccbctwcentheidealpublic
preference point and actual output is known as the public's relative preference.
A signal is sent to policy makers indicating the public's relative prclcrcn cc and the
magnitude oft he difference between that point and actua l policy output. If responsiveness is
prcscru. jjovcrmucnt will change output in the direct ion of the publics idcal point which rcflccts
the magnitude ofdifference. A new and smaller public relative preference will thus be
estab lished. The publict hen receivesa negativekedbacksignali ndicatingt he policy response
and thus adjusts its own signal to reflect the new magnitude and dircction oft hc publics relative
preference . Withoutaresponsivep ublica nda leedbacksig nal, policymakers would lacka
reward or punishment for their responsiveness or lack thereof. Po li cy outputs would not bc
linked to public support for the governing party and thus no di ff erence in electoral outcome
would be realized for reducing the public' s relative preference.
The thermostatic model has been success fully implemented by Wlczicn (1995) . Issues
wheres urwys have asked the public ll)r their desire regarding more or k ssspending have been
used to gauge the public' s preference in large spending domains, Further. reliable inf ormar iun on
actual spending can be easily obtained . Time-seriesregressionanalysisisconductcdtl)rpolicy
responsiveness to allow fo r budgetary processes that occur over the course ofa year. The same
is true for public rcsponsivcncss . a timc lag is required fo r chungcs in govcrumcnt outputs tu bc
reflected in public opinion. Thermostatic responsiveness has been found to occur in the United
States (Wlczicn 1995), the United Kingdom (Soroka and Wlczicn 2( 05). and Canada (Soroka
and Wlczicn J u lO). Increased issue saliency has been fo und to incrcasc rcsponsivcncss as it
makcs thcclcctoralcon scqucnccof policyo utputsmorclik clytoaffcctvotcsan dthus incrcasc
the potential ofan electoral penalty for failure to produce the right amount of policy. Also,
institutional arrangcmcntswhichd cmonstratc clearl incs ofac countahil ity incrcascpu blic
rcsponsivencssa ndpo licyrc prcscntation(Sorokaan d Wlezicn2 0 10).
There arc limitations to these findings. Public opinion is affected by variab les otherthan
policyoutpllts, such aslcadcrshipattrihlltcs (Savoic 20 10).1'0lic yolltput s arcalso afti:ctcdhy
variahlesothcrthanpllhlicopinion, suchast hcpolicyprdi:rcnccs of party elites (Laverand
Shcpslc 1996). Furthe r. governance is not limited to policy domains of' large spending.
Thcrcli.lrc,o thcravc nucsrcquirc cxploration using this general model.
This study will explore one oft hese avenues. An often ignored aspect oft he electora l
system in Westminster democracies is that the electorate docs not clcct thc govcmmcnt. it clccts
thc l lousc ofCommons. From that, a prime minister is selected. In turn, that prime minister
selects a cabinet ofministers. This cabinet produces most ofthe legislation that is passcd uud
also oversees the administratio n ofgovcrnmcnr dcpartmcnts (Franks 19X7). Thc Canndian cusc
providcsancxcc llcntopportunity toinvcstigatc potcntial rcsponsivcncssi nt hcco mpositionof
government. Togethe r with actual policy outputs, this function is of primary importance of ' the
governing system. Cabinet ministcrs ovcrscc thc opcrations of govcrnmcnt and thus policy
implementation as well as the production of policy from thcir admini strativc j urisdictions. This
isp articularl yim portantas thcsc individualrcprcscntativcsarcrcsponsihlcl i.lrpolic yout plltsthat
do not reach high levels ofsa lience. Policy outputs require responsiveness 10 public opinion to
substantiatc dcrnocratic representation, analogous to this is thc suhstantivcd cmocratic sclection
o fgovcmmcut itscl f Ifno res po nsive ness ex ists in thc co mposit iun ofcabinct in Canada. jhcn
gow rJlm.:nts .:k .:tion is not d.:mocratic justb .:caus.: th.: l lous.: ofC ommons is d .:ct.:d.
Tothi s ':I1lLthis studywiliapplyth.: th.:rmostaticmodd ofr.: sponsiv.:n.:ssto miuistcrial
resignations in Canada. Though it would be useful to understand responsiveness in the selection
ofministers, this cannot be meas ured as they have not been able to dem on strate ift hey can
produce what the public wants. Onth.:oth.:rhand,ifth.:public.:xpr.: ss.:sdi ssatist;lctionwitha
minister.The minister can be forced to resign. Therefore thermostatic responsiveness may be
sccn in minisrcrial rcsignntions. Minist.:rialp ositions cannot b.: ti lkd or r.:mov.:d on a scak th.:
public cannotwant gr.:at.:rorkss.:rd.:gr.:.:s of a giv.:nmini st.:r. Rathcr .fhc puhlic cun cithcr
want a minister to stay or to resign. The thermostatic analogy is thus not entirely accurate. A
light switch mode l may he more ap propria te. Though the aggre gate public prefere nce is still one
ofdegree , the gov ernment's option forrespon se is dichotomous. Like a light switch, which can
be turned on or offbut not in bctwccn; u minister can be allowed to continuc to hold his position
or be force d to resign. For the sake ofconsistency with the rationale behind Wlczicns t ! ') lJ5)
mod.:Ltll<:t':rJnth.:nn ostati<:r.:sponsiwn.: ss will continu.:tob.:us.:dt od.: s.:rib.:r.: sponsiv.:n.:ss
in ministerial resignations.
An.:x plorationof th.:Ca nadiancas.:wi ll b.: undcrtakcn to d.:t.:rmin.:ifr.:sponsiv.:n.:ss
.:xists in Canadianlllinist.:rialr.:signations. Chaptcr L wil l til<:nsonth.: institlltional cont.:xtof
Canada. both forma l and informa l, and on ministerial rcsignations as a topic diffcrcnt than othcr
actions ofg ov':rJllll.:nt and thlis warrants fLII1h.:r .:xploration.
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Mini stc rialrcsignation s havc largc lybccnovcrlookc din discuss ionsof govc rllmc nt
rcsponsi vcncss.butthcy canbc impol1antl()rcnsurin gthcpublic gctssomcaccountabil ityin
thc ir govcrllmcnt lcadcr s. Thcclcctoratccan sclcctandrcmovcMcmbc rsof l'arl iamc nta t
election tim es. This is the centr al mechani sm o fd emocratic repre sentati on in ele ctoral
democracy. However. anticip ation off uture e lectio ns has been dem onstrated to mo tiva te po licy
rcspon sivcnc ssbctwccnclcctions(Stimson. Mackucn . und Erickson llJlJ5). The e lectorate
thc rc!()rchassomc powcrtoi nllucncc govcrnmcnt actio ns bc twcc nclcctionsthro ughth is
mechani sm . T his lind ing is intcrcstin gas it ma y rclat c tothctcnurcofmini stcrs in thc
govcrumcnt. In Wcstminstcrparl iamcntary systcms. thc clcctoratc sc lcctsMcmb crs ofth c
l lou sc ofCommons, but it docs not sclccta govcnlmcnt( Russc1l 200X). T he mechanism s of
govc rnmcntsclcction occur a ftcr thcscats in thc l lousc havc bccn a1I0catcd via thc clcctora i
sys tem. Th c sclc ctionanddcsclc ction ofth cmcmbcrs ofthc govcrnmcnt may also fo tlow a
s imilar democrat ic process, Th rough the antici pation off uture e lec tions. m inisters may be
se lected who arc bel ieved to maintai n or incre ase gove rnment popul ari tyand thoscthat do not
may in turnbc rcplaccd toprcvc ntorcorrcct potential or ac tua l Iosscs in publ ic support (Dewa n
and Dowding 2( 05 ). If so.thcclcctorat cmay inl;lcthavc somcdcgrcc of cont rol ovcrthc
co mpo si tionof govcrnmcnt bcyo nd thc sc lcc tionof Mc mbcrsof l'a rliamcnt.
To invest igate respo nsive ness in ministeri al rcsignatio ns in Canada. it is import ant lir st to
cxplorc thc Canudian dcmo cracy. An overview oft he Canad ian po litical systcm will lirstbc
rct)uircd to undcrstand how thcconccptso f rcprcscntation havccvolvcd and how powcr has bcc n
d istribut ed . T his overv iew wi ll be f()lIowcd by a dcscri ptio n ofthcchangcs that havc occurrcd
and the co nsequences forrepres enta tio n and gov ernance . T he chapt er co ntinues wi th a short
discussion of how ministerial resignations can be understood as the ultimate reprimand for
violations ofministerial responsibility and how their actual usage may change the understanding
of thc responsibility of ministcrs. lt ends by concluding that thc Dcwan and Dowding (2005)
modcluscdt odctcrmincth cimpact ofpnblic opinioll ollmilli stcr ialr csigllation shouldbcu scd
to measure thcrmostntic responsiveness ill ministerial resignation inCa nada.
Basic Westminster Institutions in Canada
Canada inherited its governing institutions fro m the United Kingdom. It is thus a
Wcstlllinstcr pariialllcntarysys tcm. Though Westminster systems can have a diverse set of
institutionala mlllgcmcnts, thcy all illhcrit collvcntiolls or iginally dcvclopcdi n thcU nitcd
Kingdom. A bricf dcscription ofC anada 's tlJrlnal institutions foll ow s.
Canada has a number ofgovernance institutions. These include, but arc not limited to a
monarch( and thc monareh's represcntativc, an ullelcctcd Scnate,a nc lcctcd l lnusc otCnm mous,
andjudieiary (Franks,19X7). Due to the unclcctcd nature ofall but the l luusc ofC ommons, if
dcmocra ticrcs ponsivcllcss isto bcfuund in Callada'sgovcrnancc institutions, thcn it would be
found in thc Housc ofConuuons .
lnhcritcd from the United Kingdom, the Canadian electorate selects the members of' the
l lousc ofCo mmons through a first -pa st-th e-post electoral system (Mallor y 197} ). The country
is divided into geographical ridings that together encompass the entire country with no overlap of
constituency. The borders ofeac h riding arc selected so that the population in each is roughly
equiva lent, thou gh give n popula tion chan ge and the need to distribute ridin gson a provincial
hasis ,thcrcisnotablevariancc inpoplila tions inridings . Thcmcmbcrsofthcclectmatcincach
rid ing may each cast a sing le ballot for a sing le cand idate . The candidate that receiv es the most
votes in the rid ing w insa scat and thu s a vote in the l lousc ofCommons. The full composition
ofthc l louscofC ommons isselcctcd this way with cach riding contribllting onc rcprcscntativc.
Throu ghpcriodicelcctions,thcclectmatcofcachriding dccidcsifthcirrcprcscntativchas
adequate ly represented them . If so, thcMcmbcr ofP ari iamcntmay bc rc-elcctcd , bllt if thc
electorate dec ides that a com peting can d idate may mukc a bcttcrrcprcsc ntativct hcn thc Mcmbcr
of'Pur liarncnt may bc rcplaccd.
Forma lly, thisis tlll::Sclect ionand dcs clection mcc ha nismfm rcprcsc ntalivc dcmocracyi n
Canada, however at this poi nt the electorate has selected the compositio n oft hc l lou sc of
Co mmo ns , hut has not ch oscn a govcrllm cnt (R usscIl 200X). C.ovc rllmcnt se lec tion ma y then he
indi rcct ly intlucnccd by clcctora l prcss urcas po lic ics arc. lfs o, thc lllcchanisms of this proccss
must be under stood . Unlikc thcsclectionand dcsclcction of thc l lousc ofC ommons. the pro cess
ofselcct ingand dcsc lectinggovcrllmcnt isbascdmorconunwrittcnconvcntionandhaschangcd
ove r time (CaI1y, Cross, and Youn g 2(02).
Early Concepts ofMinisteria l Respon sibility
T hc Wcs tminstcr l'a riia mc ntarysystc m dcvc lopcdthro ug hconvcntio n over hund reds of
yea rs in the United Kin gd om . I'arli am cnt s selected a prim es mini ster and cab ine t which
prov idcdancxccut ivc ti ll1ctionand lead ro le in pol icy developm ent . Th e prime ministerwas
sc lectcd as a Mcmhcr of l'ari iamcnt who co uld ltll"ll agovc rllmcnt that could mainta in thc
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supportof thc l louscofCommons. Cabinet ministries were given out as patronage to popular
Mcmbcrs ofParliamcntin cxchangcfor supporl.Aconccntration ofpowcr inthi scxccutivcwas
inhcritcdfromthcoriginalpowcrofthcMonarchy,butunlikcl hcMonarch,lhcprimcministci
rcquircs thc ussistancc of' a number ofcabi net ministers to administcr thc largc govcnuuc nt
apparatus as well. These ministcrs arcdrawn almost exclusively from the elected l lousc of
Commonsw hich providcssomc dcmocratic rcprcscntationi n thc cxccutivc, albciti ndircct.
Conscqucntly,t hc rcsponsibility of ministcrsa lso dcvclopcd al this time (Woodhouse 1994).
Marshal and Moodic(197 1) identify four trends in thc discussio nofmini stcrial
responsibility. First,mi nistcrsarc sccntobclcgallyrcs ponsiblc Ioract s ott hc Crown bccuusc
the Crown is not responsible in person. Sccond,mini stcrsarcbothrcsponsiblcand subordinatc
to the Commons. Third, ministcrshavc moral culpability for their actions. And fourthm inisters
arc constitutionally accountable to Parliament, which can force penaltics for disapproval.Thcsc
trcuds clcarly rcflcct thc tradition ofa powerful monarchy and Parliament in thc carly British
system, Dcspitcconsidcrablc changc,lhcsctrcnds shapcdmodcrn convcntionso fmini stcrial
rcsponsibilityt hatwou ld guidcthccmcrgcnccofmorcdcmocratic govcrnmc nt. Two types of
govcrnmcnt rcsponsibility cmcrgcd bascd on thc afiJrcmcntioncd rcsponsibility of ministcrs:
collective ministerial responsibility and individual ministerial responsibility (Sutherland I l) l») ).
Thcsc two convcntionsmorc adcquatclyd cscribc thcm odcrn conccpt ofm inistcrial
responsibi lity.
Collcctivc ministcrial rcsponsibility is thci dca that thc primc ministcr andc abinct
ministcrsasacollcctivc govcrnmc ntproposct hcvast majorityof lcgislationandarcrcsponsiblc
for the executive function of Parliamcnt and in turn defend thcirdccisions in front ofthc l lousc
of Commons. Each min ister acts as p'U1 ofth is co llective . lfm ajor motion s arc dcfcutcdthcn
the government is sa id to have lost the suppo rt ofthe House of Com mo ns and must resign
(S utherland 1991) . Th is co nve ntio n orig inate d from the need to protect ind ividual min istcrs
from be ing isolated and attacke d by the Crown (W ard ]9X7). ln mo dc rn usc. u prim c ministcr
ma y protect an indivi dual mini ster from attack by exte ndi ng col lective respo nsib ility and
a llowing the govcrumcnt as a whole to take rcs pons ih ility fora poli cy cho icc oruction taken as
an exec utive , Thr ou gh co llective resp onsibilit y, the who le gove rnme nt can be fo rced to resign if
itloscsthc supportofthc l louscof Com mons .
Asopposc d toco llcctivc ministcrialrcspons ibility, thcrcisa lsoind ividua l ministcria l
respo nsibi lity . A ministcrwas rcsp on sible Ii.Jr all acts perform ed by the de partme nt ove r whic h
the min iste r held respons ibility, Th rough this mechanism, the civil service and administration of
government apparatus have a demo cratic respon sibilit y throu gh thc c lcctcd Mcmbcrof
Parliament who has been assig ned to takcthat rcs po nsibi lity txuth erland 1991 ). Th e capacit y of
a mi nister to understand all thc opcrut ions and work ings of his dcpartmcnt was ori ginnl ly a
rea listic ex pectation. A mini stcrwas. atonct imc. abletodomuchthcministry' s wor kh imscIf
orwiththcass istanccofasma llstaff( Dcnto n I9 79) . lfa cabinctmini stcrmadcancrror, hc
coul dbcli.Jrccdtorcsignwh ilcthcrcstofthc govc nlmc ntcouldcontinuc.
Hy thc mid-u inctccnth century in the United Kin gdom ,Pariiamcnt cxp cri cnccd its
pin nacle ofinfl uence . Ministcrial rcspon sibility and accounl ability was casicst to underst and , A
minist crcould bcrca listica llycx pcctc dtoundcrsta ndall thcworki ngs of his departmen t and thus
co uld be held accountable fi.lrthc action s ofthc cntircdcpartmcnl. Th e l lou sc ofCommons
could hold the minister to account and directly !lJrCC his resignation (Woodhousc 1994). The
rcsu!t was thatallmcmbcrs ofthc govcrnmcntwcrc individually accountabletot hc l lousc.
Hcforc parties and party discip line, thcorics of rcprcscntativc authority and rcsponsihility
wcrc cusicr to undcrstand. Thc clectoratcau thorizcd anM l' to act oni tsbchalfth rough an
election. All the Ml's as a group selected amongst thcmsclvcs a primc ministcrw ho could
maintuin support oft hc l lousc. This primcm inistcrsc lectcd thca dditionalca binct ministcrs t0
furm a government. Thcgovcmmcnt,asa groupan dasi ndividllalmi nistcrs,wlTcaccountable
to the l lousc ofCommons, The Ilousc could votc to cithcr !lJrcc thc rcsignation of thc
government as a whole or vote to IlJITCthc resignation of an individual cabinet minister, The
Mcmbcrs ofl'arliamcntwcrcth cn hcldaccollntablctothcir individual constitucnts !lJI·th cir
actions in Parliament through the next clcction IRhodcs. Wanna and Wcllcr2(09).
Thc convcntions ofministcriul responsibility in Wcstminstcrl'arl iamcntary systcmswcrc
inherited li'OInthcscd cmocrati ca uthority andrc sponsibility rclationships. By IX67 in Canada,
1;lctionsof Mcmbcrsof l'a riiamcnt wcrccoa lescing inlo morcstablea llianccs bascdont hc
common interests oft hose they represented. Further, departments were becoming largcrand
morc complcx whichwollidm akcthcrclat ionships bctwccndcmocralic authority and minislcrial
rcsponsibilitymorc complex(Franks I9X7).
Changes in Canadian Democracy
Anum bcrof nlCtorshavcchangcdt hc naturco fWc stminstcrdcmocracY,in Canada. Thc
asccndcncy ofpartics, changes in media technology, and changiug dcmographics and cleavages
have all aff ecte d the re lat ionship be tween the elec torate , Memb ers of l'arli arncntcahinct
mini sters , and the prime min ister (Carty, Youn g and Cro ss 2( 02 ). The result has been major
chan ges in the lines of democratic author ity and govcnuncnt rcspo nsibility.
T hough the time ofParliamentary supremacy in the United Kingdom was over by the
timeofConfe de ration in lX67, Me mberso f l'a ri iame ntwerestillvotingagainst the irown par ty
on a regular basis (Franks 19X7). This ca me to an end when parties began to so lid ify power.
Until around 1917. parties onl y exi sted within the Parli ament. Members ofParliam ent would
co mpete in highl y locali zed elect ions and patronage was used to bind them into so mewha t stable
parties (Campb ell and Christian 1995). The parti es that limn ed from co mbining facti ous, though
the y were named after ideolo gie s. we re nevera s entrenched in socict y thro ugh idco lngic s and
class as in other countries . Thi s set the foundation for the modern Canad ian brokera ge parti es
(Wo linelz2002).
Aro und the late 1910 sand the 1920s extra- parliame ntary parties began to grow. The
Liberals and then Progressive Conse rvatives began to se lect their leaders at party convention s.
Med ia was still highl y locali zed and other than the actual party leadcr .vcry powcrful rcgioual
bosses emer ged who became powe rf ul cabinet min isters in exchan gc for gaining rcgional support
1(1I' the par ty. T he parti es rel ied on these popul ar individua ls and personal con ncct ion s to wi n
support from the elec torate (Cart y, Young and Cross 2(02). The parties were primar ily vote
see king and were even willin g to make alignme nts on bo th sides of c leavag es in an attempt to
ga in more votes . Except fo r the leader and region al bosses, most Mcmbcrs ufPar liamc nt relied
on party label to w in a sea t more than part ies re lied on indiv idual cand idates . Th is was
con sidere d the go lde n age of parties (Blumlc r and Kavanagh 1999).
AticrtheSecondWoridWarandintotheearlyl960sanother ehan ge oeeurred. Part ies
increa sin g ly orga nized on a national scale . Grcatcr cmcrgcncc o fnationu l mcdia und pa rty
leaders became more imp or tant for elec tions and attra ctin g vo tes (Ca rty, Yo ung and Cro ss 2( 02 ).
The supremacy of party ove r indiv idua l ca ndida tes was fu lly es tab lished wi th the lead er bei ng
the only ind ividua l of serious sign ificancc und influence . Even the powerfu l regio na l min iste rs
had largel y di sappeared (Bah-is 1991 ). In 1963, Pearson told his minist ers that the irfunction
would mo ve from regional organi zation to Parl ia menta ry act ivit y, wcak cni ng thcir publi c ima gc
(A zo ulay 1999 ). Increas ingl y, ca ndidates owed the ir victor ies to the par ty and lcad cr instcud o f
parties owi ng the ir victories to indi vidual ca ndida tes.
A new ag e emerge d in the ea rly 1990s tha t co nti nues to evo lve . Tho ught he rcare
di fferent inte rpretations of what so rts of cha nges are occurring in politi cs, media , the e lec to ra te .
and part y sys tems. severa l chan ges a re commonly acknowledged . Medi a has bec ome more
prevalenlhothduringandbetweene!cctions(Savo ie2010). Partie s se!cctleadersontheir
capac ity to win elections more so tha n eve r as the pe rso nal iza tio n of natio na l cam pai gns have
bcco rnc param oun t. Th e image o f the par ty lead er has grown in imp ort uncc w hi lc thc ro lc otthc
pote ntial or past mi nisters has see n a significant loss of import ancc in elec tio ns (A zo ulay I')')')).
Furth er, the media has become less intere sted in in-
depth co ve rage of suh stantivetopicsandllloreinterestedin simpie and se nsationa l stor ies that
re ly on polls and other easily reported phenomena (Swansonand Manc ini 1996: Dalton 2( 02) .
The pe rso na lization of po litics with a !(lCUSon scandal and co ntrove rsy predom inate me d ia
coverage (Blum lcr and Kavan agh 1999 ). The leade r ' s ca pac ity to win vo tes through posi tive
ima geisessentiall(lrclec to ral sllcce ss .
T ho ugh part y lab el still rema ins the bes t indicato r ofvotcr intc ntionthcrc is co ns idcruhlc
reasllu to he lieve that thc perso na lizatilln llf the leade rship is hecomc increas ing ly important.LJ p
tll 44'%o f theCanadian pllpulation are aplllit ica l; they havc nostrong a fli liation wit h any
politi cal part y tCody Zuux}. T hescvolcrst hcrc!l)rcrclyon short -tcrmconsiderat ionswhcn
decidin g wh ich part y the y favour and how they w ill vote . Such short-tcrm co ns iderat ions
inclu de leadcrs hipimage, polls, pa rties ' respo nses to othcr currentsa licut issues , and event s that
arc easi ly recal led (Mi lle r and Nie mi 20(2). Thi s demon strates a clear eros ion of stab le pa rtisan
bases ofsupport for parti es. With a growing number ofalte rnative pa rtics ava ilablc to attract an
unatt ac hed clectoratc,short -tcrm issucsmusthcconsidcrc dmorc impor tanttocicctora l succc ss
than they once were.
Co nve ntions, such as ministerial respons ibility. change with usage overt ime: they arc not
co ncrete and set in sto ne ( Rhodes , Wann a and Weller 200lJ). W ith thc subst .uu ial changes that
havellccurred inCanada 's West m instcr parliamcnta rysystcm, ministe ria la uthori ty and
rcspllnsih ilitymusthcrecllnsidcred . Thcrolcs llfprimcministc r,party, l'ariiam cnt an d cabi nct
m inist er have a ll chan ged as has the balan ce ofpowerbetwee n them. The ori gina l conve ntion s
that assuredmi nistcri alrcsplln sib ilityhavct llbcreconccptua liscd .
Rcconccptu al ising Co nce pts of Dem ocrati c Authori ty and Ministerial Respons ibility
As the new fo cus on mi nisterial rcspon sibilit y cc ntrcs on thc appl icario n ofrni nistcri al
rcsignation s,t hepllwcr ha lanceandresponsihi litiesof govcrnmcntelitcsmust bc rcco nsidcrcd .
I'rincipa l-agcnt thcor y will bc uscd todcmon strate hllw thcprime ministcr has co-opted the
pow er to enforce min isterial respo nsibili ty for his own advantagc and how Membe rs of
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Pnrlinmcut havc lost influcncc. Thcl incs ofauthorityandrcspon sihilit yh avcchangcd
accordi ngly. The follow ing analysis will be considered assuming major ity gove rnment status.
Minority govcrllmcntw illbcdiscus scdl atcr.
McmhcrsofParl iall1cnth avclost a considcrahle amount of thcirautonomyandpowcr. It
is almost unthinkabl e to cunsidcr a cabinct minister being censured by the Iiousc. Thro ugh party
discipline. if a Mcmhcrof Pariiamcntvotcsagainst hcr party. shc may be expelled from the
party. As such. the House, under major ity government is unablc to hold ministcrs to account
(Page 1(90) . Conscqucntly, ministcrs arc not agcnts to thc l lousc.
Mcmbcrs of Pari iamcnth avc givcnup thispowcr bccauscth cy nccd tobcmcmbcrs of a
party to exert influence, First, to get elected, parties arc thc most enduring measure ofvot ing
intcution tOochcrt y 1(9 7). As such .Jiavin g a party label is almo st esse ntial for a candidate to
ga in an electoral victory. Parti es arc also used to determine who is going to form govcnuncnt.
In Canada, thc lead er oft he party that has won the most scats in the l lousc ofCommons is given
the opportunity to form government by the Gove rnor General. The prime min ister then selects
thccabinctmi nistcrsalll1ostcxc!usivcly ti'om his party ' s Member s of' Parliamcm. To hccomc u
cahi ncl ministcror a primc ll1inistcr rcquircs bcing a mcmbcrofa party. but thiscoll1cs with thc
loss of autonomy. Mcmhcrs of Pariiamcntolltsiuc ofthccabinct.withthc c,\ccpt ion ofleadc rs
of opposi tion particxhavc virtually no power due to party discipiinc. Thcy urc basicall y forc cd
to votcwiththcpartyonallmattcrs. lfthcydonot,thcycanbcdcll1otcdfromcommittcc
ass ignmcntsand cvcn kickcd ollt o f thc party itsclf, leaving thcm coll1plctcly vlllncrablc in thc
next electio n (Franks 19X7). A MCll1bcr ofP ariiamcnt can only act as a riding ombudsman to
scc urc pcrsonal sllpport in llpcoll1ing clections, a limitcu rolc that impacts thc votcs thcy may
rcccivclessthanpartyafti liationorcvcnt hcpopularityofthc partyleadcr (Dochcrt y 19')7 ).
Givcnthi sreiationship,t hc Mcmbcrof Parliamcn ti sa ncarlypowcrless agc nt toa party
principa l.
Thcdcelinc inpowcrofthcMcmbcrof Parliamcn t.causcdlargelybythci ncrcascdrole
oft he political party.scts thc modcrnrclationship bct\Vccn the House and the government. Th is
reiationship.s oliditic d ancr thc cnd of thc Sccond \Vorld \Var, turns thc relationship bctwccn thc
Iiousc and thc govcrnmcntbackward s. lthas bccn saidthatthc li ousci srcsponsibletothc
govcrnmcnt instcad of thcgovcrnmcnt bcing rcsponsible to thc l lousc (\Vard I<JX9) . This new
rclationshipc hangcst hc naturcof ministcrial rcsponsibilityand how it can be studied.
l'arliamcntary powcr has shincd li'OI11thc ll ousc to thc cabinct, but ovcr timc. this power
has bccomc largclyccntralizcd\V iththc primcministcr. To lilrthcrundcrstandthcappl icat ion of
conccptsof ministcrial rcsponsibility it is csscntial to undcrstand the modern role ofthe memb ers
ofcabinetThis model is appropriate to usc since the end oft he Seco nd World War, though thc
concentration ofpower since then has centralized progre ssively furt her into the hands ofthe
prime minister, The respon sibilit y ofthe cabinet minister , as will be explained shortly. has
shifted ti'OI11 Parliament to the prime minister as well. Principal-agcncy thcory illuminatcs how
changes in defacto power bring about changes in relationships of responsibility.
Instcad of starting thc dcscription of dcmocratic authority and rcsponsibility with an
elected l lousc. fhc dcscription must now start with political partics. Each partysclects a leadc r.
This leader is rcsponsib lcparticulurly leading into and during elections, to gain as much public
support for the party as possib le. Thcprimacy ofth cpartyleadcr in clect ion campaigns has been
incrcasingwitht hcdcvelopmcnto f thcncw agcofcampaigningwhichrcquircshcavily
personali zed leadership races (Savo ie 2(1 0). T hrough the popul arity that the lead er is able to
leverage, an d the work o f candidates and organi zat ion s a ffiliated with the part y in eac h ridin g.
the citi zenr y selects its I lou se of Commons through the fir st-past-thc-pos t elec to ra l syste m. T he
part y leader is thus an age nt ofa party pr inc ipal. If the party is satisfic d that the leader has
perform ed we ll in ma ximi zin g its e lectora l support. then the agen cy is maintained. lf not. a ne w
leaderisselected bythe me mhershipof the party.
Forthe pa rtyt hatsueeess tiillywont he mostrid ingsand thusobtained the most scats in
the Ilou se. the leader is appoin ted prime minister by the Govcrnor Gcncrn l. As prime ministe r,
the part y lead er has a seco nd principal. the entire citi zenr y. The pr ime mini ster is give n
resp on sibility to form and lead a gov cm mc nt that will produce publi c 0 utput s forthc country
(White 2( 05). Howe ver, the y arc a lso still the leader of their polit ica l pa rty and arc req uire d to
pro dueeoutp utsthatfavour the pa rty's membershipaswcl l. Th is often mea ns pol icy outputs
that favour the part y' s supporte rs eith er dire ctly or ideolo gicall y where possible. but it also
mean s ma inta ining or maximi zin g public suppor t for the gove rn ing party. Produc ing outputs that
arc pop ular enha nces pub lic support for the gove rni ng par ty and thus co ntinued opportunity to
govcrn tWlczicn 1995; Dew an and Dowd ing 2( 05). Co ntinued governance is esse ntia l 10
maximi ze the part y membership and suppor ters payo ffs Ih1l11 assum ing go vernment. so a prim e
minister who co ntinues to maintain or enh ance popula rity will cont inuc his agen cy to the public
and party.
Th eprimemini ster stillneedsto se lect eabine tm inister s to assistin thernnn ing ofthe
ma ssive go vernment apparatus. The se cab inet ministers enjoy con sid erable advant age and
bc nc fits ovc r bac kbcnc hcrs , As a cabinet ministe r. a Member ufPariiamenthas su hstanti all y
enhanced influence.executive function, prestige, pay, andusually an clcctorul advantage in the
next ek ctionif shedoesa goodjob( Docherty 1997). The cabine t ministers are agents to the
prime minister,as the prime ministers dects them andcan llll"Cetheir resignations. In other
Westminster democracies, this relationship is not as straight fo rward as the prime minster may be
replaced by the parliame ntary caucus. In Canada however, a largc party convention is required
where thecombined desek ction power oft he eabinet ministers. thoughp otentially influcntial. js
a small fraction of the whole dcsclcctoratc. Consequently. in Canada. prime ministers are rarely
rcplaccd j Wcllcr Inxd).
To furthe r understand this balance of power an assessment of form al power and in formal
constraints facing tbc primc ministcr must be considered. Formallythc primc ministcr of
Canada has more power than his contemporaries in othcr Wcsnninstcr parliamentary systems .
Despite the original intention that the primem inister would be the lirsta monge lluals,t hereal ity
is that the prime minister ' s cabinet ministers are agents with little form al power beyond what the
prime minister assigns (Savoie 1999). Savoie (20 10j lists these powers as fo ll ows :
...primemi nistersc hairCabi net meetings.establishCa binet processes and
procedures. set the Cabinet agenda, establish the eonsensustiJr Cabinetd eeisions.
appoint and lire ministers and deput y ministers, establish Cabinet committees and
decide on their members hip: they exercise virtually all the powers ofpatronugc and
act as personnel manager liJrtho usandsof goverIlmenta nd patronagc jobsr thcy
articulate the govcmmcnts strategic direction as outlined in the Speech from the
Throne: they dictate the pace of change and are the main salespcrsons promoting the
achievementsoft heirgovcrIlmCllt;t hey havca direct handi nes tablishingt he
govcrnmcnr's fiscal framework: they represent Canada abroad: they establish the
proper mandate of indiv idual ministers and decide all machinery 0 I govcnuuc nt
issues; and they are the final arbiter in interdepa rtmental conllicts. (p.I .1J ).
In terms of actua lly running the government. thcprimcmin istcr cnjoys considcrabk
administrative support from the Prime Minister' s Office and the Clerk oft he Privy Council who
can he used to bypass a ministera nd control a department (Atkinson and Thomas 1993).
There is thus a newl ine ofa uthority Irom thcpu blict o govcrnmcntandrcsponsibility
back to the public. Authority is passed IrOinth cpu blic. indircctly through ck ctions toaparty to
form government. That party authorizes its leader to select the cabinet. In turu. thc lcadcr
cntilrccs individual ministcrial rcsponsibilityon hisca binct. lf ac abinct ministcra ttracts
negative attention that threatens public support for the governing party. then hcra utho rit y cun he
revoked by the prime ministerw ho can lill"l:ch crrcsignation. lfthcpri mcmi nistcr isun ablc to
maintain public support lilr thcpal1y. thcp arty can rcplacc its k adcrandthush old thcp rimc
minister accountable. Thisis rarcly thccasc unkssanc kc tionis losta nd thc publica uthorizcsa
diffcrcnr purty to govcm. A dccpcr analysis oft herokofi ndividual ministcrial rcsponsibi lity
fo l low s.
PrimcMinistcr and MinistcrialR csponsibility
Thc l louse of Commons nol ongcrh asth c capacityt ocn lilrcc individual ministcrial
responsibility: this power is vested in the primc ministcr alonc. Howc vc r. jhc cnfo rcc mc nt of
responsibility may not meet the normative standards that were onec thc focu s ofscholarly
discussion. A prime ministcr must considcrr hc informal constraints placed upon him; there may
be backlash for a ministcriul resignation. The resignation may. in turn. threaten the agency oft he
prime minister to the party or the electorate.
Cabinet mini sters tend to he pop ular themse lves . T hey are the tale nt pool from which
rep lace me nt leaders a re mos t likel y drawn and so me of the m repre se nt informa l leadersh ip to
so me faction o ft he govern ing part y. A disgruntled ex- minis ter would he in an exce llent posi tion
to orga nize a co up aga inst the prim e mini ster at the next leader ship co nve ntion. Th ough
Canadian prime min isters tend to resig n at the ir leis ure, unle ss defcatcd in thc poll s. jhis
possih ilit y sti llexists( Weller2003).Jcan Chrctie n di scoveredthat. despite his abi lity to win
elections.hisriva landlimnerFinance Minist er Pau lMartinhadthe capacit y to challenge his
lead ers hip . Due to Martin' s press ure Chretien felt the need to annou nce his rcsignatio n. llc gave
himsel f IXmonth s to do so. hut again due to the pressu re from Marti n ' s supporte rs Chret ien
res igned severa l month s earlie r than planned (C hre tien 2( 07).
One of the greatest co nstra ints comes from the fact that most cab inet ministers are
se lected from a relat ivel y small ta lent pool of M Ps who tend to have short careers. This lack of
ex perience makes it difficult to create a cab inet ofministers who are not accide nt prone. Further .
a prime mi niste r must co nside r an additio na l set of co nstra ints. Cab inet is expected to have
mi nisters from eve ry provin ce and some degree of gender repr esent ation( Kerhy200'J).A lso,
some promi nent Ml' s brin g support and finance to the parry wh ich sho uld be rewa rded w ith
cabinet appo intme nt. Give n these const rain ts. it wou ld he inadvisable fora prime mi nisterto
fo rce the resi gnation ofa cabi net minister on thc nonn ativc grounds ofconvcntion nlonc.
Certai n demograph ic factors may also help to protect a min ister from resignatio n. There
is un cxpcc tation that pro vinces w ill he repres ented in ca binet . Th is expe ctat ion is in fact qu ite
stro ng. Se ldom do prime ministers riskv io lating thisexpectation li ll' rcaro f losse s in publi c
support from the affected pro vince . So mi nis ters from provin ces with few Memb ers of
I'arl iam<:nlthal<:ouldb<:r<:pla<:<:m<:nls should<:xp<:ri<:n<:<: som<:additiona l prot<:<:t ionlrom
rcsignarion rl Icard 1991). Furth<:r,th<:r<:hasb<:<:om<:agrowi ng<:xp<:<: tationt halwom<:nwillh<:
rep resented in cabinet . Both th<:provincia lan d g<:nd<:rimp.:rativcs ar<:<:nhancnl by th<:smalkr
numb<:rofpossibkr<:pla<:<:m<:ntst hat may <:xistinth<: numb<:rof gov<:rtlm<:nt Ml's( lkard 1991).
Age may also be a characte ristic that affects resignatio n likeli hood. Younger ministers have
longer career s ahead ofthem and arc thus more likely to resign over differi ng opinions in policy
prcfcrcncc j Ucwan and Dowdin g 200S).
l-orcing rcsign.uic ns can also damage support for the gove rning party or prime minister
himself A r<:signationiso li<:nt h<:lIrst indication th<:publi<:r<:<:<: iv.:s that som<:thingiswrongin
government. Resignati ons tend to attract negative media attention to issues that may not haw
otherw ise gained salicncc t lic wan and Dowdin g 200S). Furth<:r, ifth <:prim<:minist.:r !illT<:s th<:
r<:signationoftoomany minist<:rsi tmayc alli ntoqu<:stion th<:capacityoft h<:prim<:minist<:rto
manag<:gov.:rtlm<:nt,!in1h<:r thr<:at<:ninghisag<:ncy. Thusi tshouldb<:<:xp<:ct<:dthatth<:p rim<:
minister would be willin g to !iJrc<:r<:signatio nsifpublicpopu larity isatstak<:orinth<:<:v<:ntofa
leadersh ip challe nge, but would prefer to avoid them where possible, This balance of
wi llingness to force resignations also may be affecte d by the idios yncras y of individual prime
m inister s and part ies .
Tothispoint, majority gov<:rtlm<:nt sta tus hasb<:<:n larg<:\yassumcd, however in the case
ofCa nada.w hen the largest party has 1:likd to gainmor<:than SO'X, of th<:s<:ats in lh<:l lousc uf
Commons, minority gover nments have !iJrlll<:d(Russ<:1I 200X). Undcr thcsc c irc umstancc s. fhc
prim<:minist<:risr<:quir<:dto gainth<: support of atkast on<:opposition party to pass legislat ion.
In the eve nt that this is not achieved fora confidence motion , thc govc rmnc nt fulls and typically
an election will be ca lled (Forscy 19( 4). It cannot be assumed that under minority government
that the l louse has regained its lost power to authorise govcm rncnt. j ust that opposition party
leaders gain some leverage over the government. The key to continued governance is policy
concession (asmembershipi ncabinct asa conditionof support isacoalition) . l lo\\'ever,
opposition parties may not want an election even if they can force 0 ne (Stw mI 990).lf the
public support for the governing party is equal or higher than it was at the previous election, the
oppositionparties gain nothing by liJrcing anekction. Consequently, a prime minister may be
more prone to tiJrcetheresignationofamini stert oprevcnt losscs in public support under
minority government. The potential backlash is lower as well. Because the governing party
would be aware of potential losses of publie support by an internal power struggle, such an event
would be less likely. Further.theprimem inisterd oesnothave theluxury ofassum ingthat she
lVill holdof!ice longenoughlill·the negativeimpactsof tiJrcing too many resignation s to
accumulate. It should also be noted that if the prime minister docs in fact Iurcc a ministcr to
resign, then there arc fewer potent ial replacement ministers . Minority government therefore
creates additional incentives and constraints on enfo rc ing individual ministerial responsibility.
Principle-agency theory provides a newu nderstanding oft he cunccpt ofm inisterial
responsibility. The cab inet minister is no longer understood to be responsible to Purliumcnt or
the electorate, but rather to the prime minister. During majority governments, the l lousc is also
responsible to the prime ministert hrough party discip line. Thc prime minister is responsible toa
party andthe ek ctorate.theprimeminister·s job islargclyt ilCussed upon ensuring maintenance
of publie support. In turn, maintenance ofpublic support is the rcsponsibility oft hc cabinct
minister to the prime minster. The cabinet minister' s duty is to avoid unpopular outputs from her
department. avoid unpopular conduct of the department' s employees. and avoid becomi ng
unpopular herself.
The line of democratic authority moves from electorate to the party to the prime minister
to cab inet ministers. Responsibility is enforced on cabinet ministers by the prime minister. who
in turn can be remove d from power by a party. Finally the party is responsible to the electora te
through elections, In terms of ensuring individua l and colk etiveministcr ial responsibility. the
I louse of Commons has become an intermedi ate vote count and Mcmbcrs ofP arliamcnt little
more than numbers that gauge relative part y strength.
Contcxt ofR cscarch v Ministcria l Resignations
Theearlyseholarly litcrat ure on the subjeetof ministerialr esignation was motivated by
the same nonnat ive ideals that motivated the discussion on ministcrial rcsponsib ility. The focus
was primarily on when a minister ought to resign. when ministcrs should havc rcsigncd. und how
prime ministers have fai led to properly enf orce individual ministcrial rcsponsibility t l'agc 1990 ).
It would be easy to underest imate the value of understanding convcntion because the literature
ont hes ubjeetisrife with norll1ative eonnotation. l lowever. there mayb e more pract ical value to
understanding this research. Co nvention plays a role in how elites. media. and the public
interpret the act ions of individual mini sters and primc ministcrs. Convcntion may hclp tramc
public debate on an issueorthe prill1e minister's response toan issuc, The need to
sys tematiea lly understand the reasons behind aetual ministerial resignation is of greater
importance. Understanding why ministers resign should. in turn. uffcct our undcrsranding or
o:xpo:o:tations abolltwho:ntho:yshollldro:sign. Convention aftera ll is ut lcast partially dcfi ncd by
its usage.
Giw n thc w lllpk xity of both constraints and lllotivcs to ti.lrcc ro:signations. bcyond
norlllativo:rcasoning,adivcrso:lito:raturchas dcvclopcd. Motivcsti.lrrcsignat ionthathavcbo:cn
outlined so furi nclude protection for loss in popularity tl.rcwand and Dowding 2( 05),
punishment for challenges to thc govcnuncnt (Dowding and Kang 1991'), and holding to
o:onw ntion (pago:I990). FlII1ho:r, prolllotions to bctto:r appointmcntsOlltsido:of cabino:t.
particularly t rue in tho:immedia t e post-war period, were often c o ns i d e red better p a t ro n a g e than
the cabinet minister position. Conso:qllcntly. solllo:ministo:rshavcro:signo:d tota ko:a promotion.
Motivcsaro:ofknbrokcndownintorcasons ti.lrrcsignation instead . This provides a larger
possiblct ypologyo fro:signations. Though the possible typolo gie s vary and cannot be listed , to
demonstrate tho:diversit y a few will be incllldcd. lnconsido:ring AlIstralia 'sministcrial
resignat ion iSSllO:S, Pago:(1990) refers to three categories that ine lude act oft he mini ster ' s
do:partmcnt .a ctorpolicyoftbo:ministcra ctingi nt hcmi nistcriaI capacity, and an act of tho:
ministo:ri n privatcc apacity.S lItho:r1and (199 1)i do:ntificsa morc w mprcbo:nsivo:listof l2 callso:s
ofresignati on which involve s dividing some of'Pa gcs cate gories into sma ller reason s and adds a
varict y ofuthcrrcasons.
Constraints havc also bo:cn discllsso:da t lcngth. Tho:scincllldct i.mna lconstraintssllcha s
institutional charac teri stics. For o:xamplc. wn stitlltions candictatcwhcthcrornotaprimc
lllinisto:rcan sckctro: placo:mo:ntsfromolltsidcof Pariialllo:nt. The requirement to se lec t from
within reduce s the numbe ro fp ossib le replace me nts which mak es forcing a rcsignation lcss
dcsirablc tOowdi ng and Dumont 2( 09). There arc also informal const raints. l-or cxamplc.Jn a
coal ition government. a prime minister may be requ ired to consult thc lcadcr ofa j unior coalition
partner hefore she is able to foreet heresignation of am inisterfrom the coalition partner' s party
(Fisher and Kaiser 2( 09).
As a result of the flourishing ofty pologies of resignations and institutional arrangements.
a diverse literature has deve loped concerning ministerial resignations. The result has been a
desire toconduet systematieanalysisand produeecomparable findings. There has thus been a
call to develop comparab le datasc ts of resignations between states (Dowding and Dumont 2( 09).
Also,a scleet ionb ias hasheen identiticd in thes tudyof ministerialr esignations. Most studies
have failed to prope rly focus on when ministers do not resign (Dowding and Kang 199X). That
is, a systematic analysis of potential incidences when ministcrs could have been expected to
resign,h utdid not, havel argclyheenexci udedti'OI11researeh.
More reeent seholari yaetivityhasmadeanattempt toa ddresshothprohlems. Datuscts.
thoughpainstaki ngtoeolleet, areemergingthatinciudefiili lists of noliresignations as well.
Seholarshave heen identifyingv ariahlesw hiehea nbeeomparedae rosss tates, but also those that
are relevant to particular states (Dowding and Dumont 200X). However. the link between
eleetoralp ressurea nd resignation hasheen made.buto nlyasoneof many potentia leauses.
Dewan and Dowding (2005) made the first attempt to determine ifm inisterialresignatio ns
resulted li'OI11 losses in public support and if they in fact corrected those losses. They did so by
conducting an ordinary least squares regression analysis. This analysis included a rich set of
economieand politiealco ntrolvariables toe nsure thate hangesi n publie support generated by
otherf; \etors would he taken into aecounl. Further, they incorporated instrumental variables to
control fllr othert;\etorsth at aeeountf llrresignations. This methodology allowed Dewan and
Dowding to property conclude that in the United Kingdom resignations do result from losses of
puhlie support andth at a correetive cffeetd oesoeeuL
These findings arc very interesting. Though they arc not directly related to
responsive ness in Dewan and Dowding (2005), they fo llow the responsiveness literature script
nicely. In representative democracy, representatives arc elected to produce policy on behalfo f
the elcetorate.Thisi ndireet reiationship means that responsiveness of policy output cannot he
taken for granted and must be measured. The results have been positive in salient policy
domains (Soroka and Wlczicn Ju lU). The same indirect relationship exists between the
electorate and thegoverIlment,y ct ministerial responsihility is rarely understood in termso f
responsiveness,
The Dewan and Dowding (2005) methodology, applied to Canada would serve several
functions. First and for emost it would determine whether or not thc govcrnmcnt was rcsponsivc
to public preference in the usc of the ultimate application of ministcrial accountability.t hc
resignation, It would also provide an appropriate ministerial resignation comparison between
Canada and the United Kingdom: specifica lly with the creation ofa full dataset of
nonresignations fo r Canada. This research also has the capacity to support the motivation for
ministerial resignations given that the practice docs not tend to fo l lo w the traditional concepts of
when ministers ought to resign.
Chapters I and 2 have provided the necessary hackground to understand the importuucc
of responsiveness in ministerial resignation. They have also provided the necessary inf ormation
about the Canadian context and identified the appropriate modcls to usc in the upcoming
ana lys is. Chapters 3 and 4will provide the data , ana lysis, and discu ssion of findings otthc
thesis.
CII 3 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS AND RELEVANT VARIABLE IDENTIFICAT IOI
The relationship between public opinion and government output is complicatcd. There
are many factors which shape public opinion and particular govcrnmcut outputs. Ministerial
resignatio ns are particu larly complex outputs and thus add a greater degree of complexity to an
otherwise complicated relationship. To thatend,thisc hapterwi ll providea qllalitativea nalysis
of an individual ministerial resignation. The qualitative analysis will demonstrate the idea l
thermostatically responsive relationship between public op inion and ministerial resignation in a
Canadian case. In doing so, it will also bring light to a number of the motives and constraints
placed on a prime minister when facing a resignation issue. To that end,th e 2002 resignation 0 f
Lawrence MacAulay (Liberal. 37th Parliament) has been selected for qualitative analysis. This
case was selected because it fits the proposed model of how losses in public support fi ll ' the
governi ng party may influence the prime minister' s decision to force a cabinet minister 10 resign.
MacAulay' s resignation is an exception to the norm because the proposcd rclationship is so
clearly ddined. ltalso highlightsso meoft he most relevant l:lctorsa ffecting ministerial
resignations. The cxccptionalism of this case points to the need lor a rich set of control and
variables as no other ease so de arly shows the predicted thcrmostatic responsiveness.
Second, a nllmber ofo ther variables, determined by existing Canadian literature
mentioned in chapter 2, will be explored thatmaya fti:ct the decision to force resignations.
Ilonour ratios lilI· these variables will be ealculated tod etermine which ones will be used as
eontrolva riahlesa nd whicho nes maybeomiltedfromtilrthera nalysis. After this section is
complete, not only will Dewan and Dowding's work be replicated in the Canadian context , but it
can he modified to include otherwise important omitted variables and exclude potentially
irrelevan t variables present in Dewan and Dowding 's model. The result wi ll be a Canadian
measure of thermostatieresponsiveness inminister ialresignationthat isbothmoree rtieient and
whiehmi nimizes bias( King. Keohane.and Verba 1994).
Qualitative Analysis: Lawre nce Mac/vulay
Lawrence MacAulay' s resignation in 2002 is an ideal ease for qual itat ive analysis.
Unlike most eases. MacAu lays resignation has public opinion datu availab lc bcforc thc cvcnt.
betweent he ealllil r resignationa nd theactuai res ignation,a nda tier the resignationo ccurrcd
which makes discussion of publ ic opinion possible . Addi tionally, though all relevant variables
pertaining to ministerial resignatio n in Canada do not come into play, many of the most
important ones do. MacAulay' sresignation provides insightinto the primeminister' s motives to
force a resig nation. constra ints that favour extending protection to the affected minister. and
contextual info rma tio n which highlights the role of other factors in this decision.
Lawrence MacAulay was a long-term supporter of Liberal Prime MinistcrJc an Chrcticn.
l lc was a Prince Edward Island co-chairman ofC hrctiens Libera l leadership bid in !9X4a nd
remained an adamant Chretien loyal ist ever since (Cllobe and MaiI 2002a). The Liberal Party
was divided into two factions with each having its loyalists and lcadcrs. One camp was led by
Chretien who was considered the ideo logical successor of Pierre Trudeau and the other was led
by Paul Martin who was considered the ideological successor of John Turner. After a divisive
leadersh ip contest in !990 Chretien gained leadership of the Liberal Party and in 1993 he became
prime minister (Dclacourt 2(03 ). MacAulay, a long-time Chretien supporter and compctent MI'
was rewarded and given a ser ies ofs ub-cabinet and cabinet posts. These posts included
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Sccrctary ofS tarc t vctcruns) Irol11l<J <J3-1<J <J 7, Sl:l:ITtary ofStat l:(A tlantil: CanadaOpportun itil:s
Agc ncyj from I<J <J(,- !<J<J 7, Minister ofLa bour from I<J<J 7- 1<J <JX, SolicitorGc ncrai ofCanada
I<J<JX-2002, and regional minister for Prince Edward Island from 1<J<J 7-2002 (Parliament of
Canada Wl:bsitl:2 0 1Ia). Mal:Aulay rl:l:l:ivl:d littll:n itil:a l attl:ntion lIntil spring2 002 whl:n
opposition attnckcd him OWl' his attempt to secure federal funds IIIr u collcgc opcratcd by his
brother. At that point, MacAulay was defended by Prime Minister Chretien who fended off the
attacks (Globe and Mail 2002b). The media IlJeUSon MacAulay was largely overshadowed by
coverage ofthe ongoing Martin challenge to C hretien's leadership oft he Liberal Party and the
sudden resignation of Defence Minister Art Eggleton (Liberal, 37' h Parliament) OVl:!" an
untcndcrcd contract uwardcd to his ex-girlfriend.
Spring 2002 thus highlights a turning point for the Liberal Party. Chretien, who had
l:njoyl:da hl:avily spliI1ll:rl:doppositions incl:l: ll:ctl:d in l<J<J3 anda strongl:l:onol11y(Clarkson
2( 05) now lilcl:d two thrl:ats. First, Paul Martin, a long time party rival ofChretien was at odds
with and challenging the Prime Minister long enough to merit hisrcsignution from cabinct
(Dd acourt2003). Thisbattll: rl:l:l:ivl:dconsidl:rabkcovl:ragl:i nnationall11l:dia . This coverage
didnot lllcuso n thl: nl:l:u lllr PauI Martinto stl:p uown; instl:ad it IlJeuSsl:don whl:nC hrctil:n
shollld rl:sign and hand thl: rl:igns to PauI Martin. Thl: sl:condthrl:atcan1l:fi'ol11agrowing sl:nsl:
that the Liberal party was soft on patronage, Chretien had long considered it a point ofpride that
his govl:rningLibl:ra lsha d notl: ndurl:ua scandal; however, in spring 2002 AI1Eggll:tonwas
forced to resign because ofa finan cial scandal, as noted abovc (Dl:lacourt 2(0 3).lnWcstlllinstcr
l'a rli.un cnta ry systcms. individual ministerial rcsponsibilit y -ecnforccd through resignation - isa
conve ntion which is not one that is applicd uniformly throughout t imc or bctwccn primc
ministers, but rather evolves over time with its usage (Dowding and Kang I<J<JX). In forcing
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Eggleton to resign, Chretien seta benchmark where he was tough on patronage. The media
would usc this benchmark in coverage of later financial scandals. This point is particularly
difficult for Chretien as he set an image !ilr himselfofadministeringaseanda lli 'ee governme nt;
an image that cannot be upheld in the face ofresignations based on scandal (Globe and Mail
2002b).
In Octobe r 2002, Lawrence MacAulay was publically accuscd of another linan cial
scandal. Thisti me he gavea contract toa fi-icnd'scompany !ilr strategica dv ice. The friend was
MacAulay' s ofti cial agent inpastcie ctions. Part of his defence was that another partner in the
friend 's firm handled the actual work. The particular partner in the friend 's firm who provided
the strategie advieeturned outt obethelill'lnerdeputym inister !ilrV eteranAm,irswho servcd
under MacAulay as Secretary of State (Veterans). Minister MacAulay then puhlically defended
himscif by claiming he had previouslyp aid theliJnnerdeputymin ister out ofh is constituency
budget lilrworkpertaining to MaeAulay'srole as regional minister filr Prince Edward Island.
The Prime Minister also tried to defend MacAulay by claiming it was a small technical error;
however opposition linked this event with Chretien and his government being soft on patronage
(Globe and Mail 2002b).
The financial scandal was portrayed as the newest iteration of ongoing Liberal cronyism
and patronage; the exact opposite of the image that Chretien promoted of his govern ment. The
responsibility for allowing this patronage was placed on Chretien who was accused of letting
these issues slide. To the public this would seem like a reasonable accusation. That sumc ycar
many other Liberal ministers had received public criticism and calls for rcsignation covcrcd by
the Globe and Mail fix wrongdoings including: Alfonso Gagliano. Dun Houdria. Denis Coderre,
and ofcourse AI1 Eggletun.eae hufwhumwereChr':tien supportcrs t Oclacourt 2003).
Chretien then had to face a difficult choice. Forcing MacAu lay to resign could restore
lust public support and improve the Liberals chances ofwinning govcrnmcnt in thc ncxt clcction.
Though that election was still several years away. the Liberals ' popularity had been stagnant for
some time. More importantly. in September 2002. support for the Liberals was 44'y.,(Environic s
September 2(02). but hy October , after the calls for resignation of MacAulay had received
considcrab lc uttcution. xupport for the Liberal Party dropped to ol1% (Environies Oetuber 2002).
Though the impact ufa3'X,loss in public support could bc wcathcrcd hy thc govcrmncnt ovcr
two years. it was still lInelcar if sllpport would eontinllet ub el ostbccausc of this event. Also,
the string ofscandals bud nut stopped at that puinta nda message to the cabinet could prevent
linure seandalswhiehcollldhaveeallsedlill1heriusse sinpllblie slIppurt.
Ontheotherhand.t herewerea nllmberufconstraintst hatwolll dhavemadeitdiflieult
tor Chretien to force MacAulay to resign. MacAulay was an important and lungstanding
Chretien ally, A fte r years ofw orking together, MaeAulay would have eertainlyb uilt apersonal
relationship with Chretien, More importantly. as a longstanding Chretien supporter and ally. he
would have been a useful in defeati ng Paul Martin's lcadcrship challcngc. Instead. as a
potentially disgruntled ex-minister . MacAuluy could havc bccomc a newfound Martin supporte r.
In theend.Chr':tientilreedt heresi gnationuf MaeAulaya ndre placed him with Wayne Easter
(Libera l. 37'h Parliament). who assumed the roles ofSolicitor General andm inister representing
Prince Edward Island (Pariiament uf Canada 20 1Ib).
II would seem that the resignation of MacAulay d id in fact corrcc t for losscs in puhlic
support generated by his sca nda l. In Sl:ptl:mbl:r,primtoM ,Il:Aulay' s l:allfor rl:signati on, thl:
Liberal Party enjo yed 44%. public support. In October, after the ca ll for his res ignatio n. Liberal
Party support droppcd tu -l lX•. Finally in Dl:l:l:mbl:r, a ftl:r lVhll:Aulay' s rl:signat ion, thl: Liberal
l'aI1yba d risl:nbal:kto44%(Environil:s Dl:l:l:mbl:r2002 ). ASl:anda l free quart er tilIIowed
showing an elevation of Liberal support to 50% (Ipsos-Rc id Apri l 2( 03).
The long -term results of these eve nts are also worthy of consi de ratio n. Though the
dl:l:ision to lilrl:l:M al:Aulay to rl:signdid sl:l:m to wrrl:l:t tilrl osSl:S in public support genera ted
by thc scandal. jt wou ld sl:l:m that Chrctil:nm isj udgl:dt lwr l:latiwwl:igbtsofthl:t hrl:atst ohi s
agency as prime minister. I'aul Martinwas l:wn tually abll:t orl:plal:l: Cbrct il:n,th ougb Cbrctkn
was able to drag out his eve ntual departure by 14 months (Dclacourt 2( 03). An extra ally in the
l:abindmaynot havl:bl:l:nl: noughtofully protl:l:t Chrctk n, butitwould seem as though
continued high levels ofp ublic support were not enough either. Despite his efforts to crack
down on patronagl:, llwal:l:usat ionsof patro nagl: in thl: Libcral Govcmmcnt under Chretien
would sl:tthl:bal:kdroptilrthl:SponsorshipSl:a ndalandlatl:rGo llll:ry Collllllissionwh idlplayl:d
a considerable role in the downfall ofthe Liberal government under Martin (Gidcngil. Blais,
Ew ritt, Fo urn icr. und Nl:vittl:2 ( 06).
The GISl: of Mac/vu lays resignation highl ights the impo rta nt fac tors surrounding the
l:hoil:l: to lilrl:l: a ministl:r to rl:sign. Thl: motivl:sto tilrl:l: thl: rl:signation of a ministn all w ml:
ro bcar .J ncluding: publ ic support for the party, agency as leader ofthe party, and parl iamentary
co nve ntion. Thl:prl:didl:dimpad Sofsl:anda l and subs l:qul:ntrl:si gnation aIT aIsovi sibk in this
case. An additio nal factor that is largely overlooked in the narrative. but importan t to thc
government, is that MacAulay was a mini ster from Prin ce Edwa rd Island and thu s the s ing le
minister respo ns ible fl)r that provinee . Given the perceived importa nce o f prov inc ial
representation in cabinet (Mallory 1971 ),M aeAul ay should have been pro tec ted beca use so few
alterna tives exist who co uld rep rese nt his province. Th e reaso n may have been that de spite the
low numb er of possible replacement s, one d id exi st. Wayne Eas ter did not onl y replac e
MacAulu y as the prov incia l repr esent ative in cab inet , but was 'liso given the pos ition as So licitor
Ciencra l (Pariiament ofCanada Website 20 1Ia ). Th is ind icates that Chretien con side red Easter
comp etent enough to be in cabinet and not onl y serve as a symbo l toh is provi nce. Th e type of
res ignation issue wa s a lso releva nt. lJnlike po liey erro rs,seandals are very visible to the publie
and eha llengethepublie·strustin govc rnme nt. ltrequire svery litt leof the public to envi sio n a
po litician who has inappropriatel y g iven government mone y to a friend or famil y member. The
rea son for a res ignatio n iss ue wi ll also be impor tant to co ns ide r in an y quuntitativc ana lysis.
Give n the complexit ies of the a fo rementioned case, it is evident that quite a few variables
facto r into resignation deci sions . The next section of thi s cha pter briefl y de scribe s. explains and
tests a numb er of pote ntia lly re leva nt variables. Those var iables with attributes which have
subs tantia lly di fferent hono ur ratios wi ll be includ ed in thc rcs ponsivcncss mo dcl s ofchaptcr u.
Relevan t Varia ble Iden tification
To explore additional variables that maybe relevant to thc dcci sion to forcc u miu istcrto
res ign fir st requires the idcnt ifi cation ofrclcvu nt varia bles and thcn unalys is to dctc rmi nc thc ir
impact. To that end. a dataset of resignation issue s has bee n co llected . A resi gnation iss ue is an
eve nt where the prime mini ster has a moti ve to force a resignat ion . It is easy enou gh to identi fy
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resignalions as they attraet considerable attention, but it is not so easy to identify when a
resignation may have occurred but the prime ministerchose not to. A content analysis of The
Globe and Mail was conducted to determine calls for resignation Ii·om ll)45to 20 11. All calls
fix resignation were coded for affected minister, party, prime minister, agc ofatfcctcd minister,
gender ofaffected minister, minority/majority government status. province ofconstituency,
reason for rcsignariun.u nd resignation type (see Table I). Further. the level of cove rage received
in the Globe and Mail was recorded. This will be considered in Chapter 4. As some resignations
occur without a preceding call for resignation, Dr. MatthewK erbyp rovided a fi illd ataset or
ministerial resignations that was added to the calls forr esignations. Overlapped calls lor
resignation that were also found in the resignations were removed from the dataset. Resignations
that occ urred without a preceding cull were also coded. Consequently, resignation issues are
defi ned as the sum of resignations and nonrcsignations as defin ed in Dewan and Dowding
(2005).
l lonour rarios arc calculatcd to determine the impacts oft hc uforcmcntioncd variablcs on
ministerial resignations. Iionour ratio is a coneeptd eveloped by Dowding and Kang (I l)l)X) to
determine how often ministers resigned when faced with a resignation issue, As the name
implies it assesses how often prime ministers net honourably and cnfu rcc individual ministcrial
aeeountability. l lonour ratiosa re thuse aleulated by dividing the number of resignations by the
number of resignation issues.l lcre. the eoneept is used more widely. It is not used to assess how
honourable prime ministers have been. Instead it is used to identify variables that maybe
relevant in prime ministers decisions to force resignations. If substantial differences are found in
attributesof a particular variable, then it should be included in regression analysis. Therefore,
the honour ratio is calculated for every attribute ofa variable. Substantially diffe rent honour
ratios fix the differe nt attributes ofany given variable indicate that the variable has an impact on
thed ecisiontotl)rCearesignation. For example, if the honour ratio is considerab ly higher Il)l
male minister than female ministers , then it can be said that worncn havc grcatcr protcctiun from
forced resignation than men. Because age is a variable with a large number of attributes, it was
Illadeintoacategorica lva riablefl)r the purposeofcaleulating honourrat ios.
Variables that are rclevants hould have large differences in the honour ratios in lhe
attributes of the variable. Honour ratios have thus been calculated for reasons for resignation ,
party, prime minister, gender, government status, age, and constitucucy ofuffcctcd minister to
determine how these variables affect resignations (see Tab le I ).
Table I Honou r Rnt ios Ior Sc lccted Va ria hies
Resignat ion
Rat ios
Resignati ons per
0.167 16 7 0.667
106 122 0.13 1 13.1 0 .78
0 .286 28 .6
0 .059 5.9
n y 0 .125 12.5
~ ~ ~
~
0.5 ~
~
~ g ~ ~ ~
~ n 0.182 ~ ~
* ;\ 11 value s were ca lculated Ih llll I94 5- 20 11. ** Agc \'alucse xcludc 2 nollfcsignalions and I rcsignatiou associ.ucd
w ith Su/ annc Blais-Circnicr bc...'causc hcr agc \\'as nola\'ailahlc
Thc first two variuhlcs that will be considered arc "reaso ns for resignatio n"and
" res ignation type" . Thcsctwuvariablcs cancallscproblcll1swilhassllll1plionsofllnit
homogcucity in rhc later regre ssion ana lyses. " Rcsignation typc't will not be discussed in term s
ofhllnllurralillsbccallsclhclypcswillcilhcrbcdctincdasi ncidcnccswhcrcrcsignatio nshavc
occurred or have not. No type will include both.
Reasons for Resignation
A minister ca n e ither threaten to rem ove the pr ime minis ter's agc ncy as part y lcadcr
(Weller 2( 03 ) or threate n to lose the party' s control of the gove rnme nt (Dewan and Dowdin g
2( 05). Both of these th reats eanoeman aged if theprime mini stermain tain s or increases puhli c
suppor t forhi s pnrty. She must a lso prote ct aga inst attac ks from possibl e usurp ers from w ithin
the cabi net itscl f'{Dow ding and Dumon t 2( 09 ). To protect publi c suppor t the prim e minister
ma y force the resig nation ofa minister who has ca use d losses in public support, who is pro ne to
error s which may cause losses in public support, or who interna lly is moun ting a cha llenge
aga inst the prime mini ster ' s author ity. The last case is perhaps the most threa tening as it is not
just a chul lcngc . but a cha llenge that ca n have the effect of ca us ing losses of public suppor t
whi ch further weake ns the prime minister. Further, convention may also dictate when prime
mi nisters force resignation s. Thou gh co nve ntio n docs not directl y threa ten age ncy , it ca n
potentiall y shape the natur e ofpublic discour se around an event.
Reason of issue was also coded as pe r the coding scheme out lined in Dowdin g and Kan g
(199X). The followin g co ding scheme was ap plied: I - po licy d isagreemen t, 2 - pe rso nal error ,
3- pcrfo rmancc.vl depar tment al error, 5 - other co ntrove rsy. 6 -sexual scanda l. 7 - fin anc ial
sca ndal. X- personality d ash . Thi s codin g sc heme was created by Dowdin g and Kan g(19
')X)
and is inte nded to help mak e morc co rnparab lc cross- nationul stud ics. Despitethis .these
cate gorie s arc not entire ly mutua lly exc lusive . Oti cn.aresignatio nissue maycompriscdements
of more than one ca tego ry or the give n reason for a res ignati on may lit one categor y. but the
obvio us reas on (publicly discu ssed) fit anoth er. A thirdproolcmisthatthedifferen eebctween
" persona l erro r" and "other co ntrove rsy" is some what subjective a d istinctio n. For thccodi ngof
this dataset, "other controversy" was used when the media discussed a scandal that did not
adequately fit either of the "sexual scandal" or " fi nancial seandal't catcgorics v Pcrformancc
required mcdiadiscussionofconti nucdproblcms in conjunction with the curre nt event or simply
long-term problem criticisms .
The tindi ngsarc telling as to how the prime minister interprets his threats. The most
Icthal forms ofrc signationi ssues arepcrsona lityclash(honourratio of 1.(00) and policy
disagreemcnt(honourra tioO.625). This should not be interpreted to mean that if a minister and
the primc ministcr do not likeone another personally or disagree on any issue thatt he ministcr
should he forced to resign. Prime ministers would havc considcrably morc important things to
consider than whom they did not like or who did not agree with a dccision (Alderma n and Cross
19X5). If howevcr the rift is so severe as to merit public ancntion . then the threat of resignation
becomes staggeringly high.
It makes sense that these are among the most lethal issues as they rcpresent ministers who
are in leadership roles in the party who represent pan y mcmbcrs -i both Mcmbcrs ofParliamcn t
and extra parliamentar y - and members of the public who disagree with the prime minister.
These cases are thus direct challenges to the prime minister' s ageucy as party lcadcr. Further,
they represent a breakdown of apparent party cohesion. This can potentially cause losses of
support for the governing party which in turn threatens the party' s ability to fonn govcrnmcnt
and thus maintain the leader' s agency as prime minister (Suthcrland 1( 9 1). When the ministers
do retract their challenge, the prime minister is able to increase coutrol ovcr that potcntial rival
and show support for the facti on they may represent. The difference in resignations and
nonn:signations in cithcr pcrsonality clashcsor policy disag rccmcnts comes down to the
ministcr· sdccisionto dc fyt hc primc ministcror not. with clcar-cutramitica tions .
A second group ofcauses for resignation arc scandals. Sex ua l scandals. financial
scandals. and ot he r controvers ies encompass the runge ofscandals in the resign ation issue
dat aset. Th is group ofevents is the nex t most lethal form o fr esig na tion issue , The y tend to
encom pass a serious threat to losses in public support and arc well dcfin cd as cvcnts whcrc
ministers ought to resign in the normative literature on individual ministeria l responsib ility.
These arc the times when ministers j ust have to go (Dowding and Kang 199X). Because a
scandalous minister can bring shamc toa party. it would seem as ifth cy urc lcss ofun intcma l
threat to the prime minister and as such provide less ofa threat to replace the prime minister as
leader .
Sex ual scandals. though quite rare. arc also highly lethal. The minister normall y resigns
inunc diatcl y to avo id tarnishing the image of' the par ty and govc m mc nt. Rob ert Coa tes and
Francis Fox both resigned before ca lls were even made, Iialf thc ministcrs affcctcd by scxua l
scandal resign (hono ur ratio 0.5). Financial scandal is also qu ite lethal . Scandals. financia l ones
in particular. arccasi lyscnsationalizablc by thcmcdiaand tit the image ofcorruption and
untrustworthin ess. As a result a prime minister would be well advised to force the resigna tion of
aministcrwho hasbccn accuscd ofbc ing involvcd in a fin ancial scanda \. It would be diffic ult to
imaginc that Maurice Lamon tagnc and Rcnc Trcmblay Iboth Libcral. 26th Parliamcnn could havc
bccnk cpt incabi nctaticra lcngthy invcstigationrcsultcdi n thcd iscovcr y thatt hcya cccp tcd
furniture Ii'omorganizcdcrimc. Thc dcc ision to !l)rccthcscrcsignations crcatcdprobl cms for
maintainingQucbccrcprcscntatio ni n cabinct.but dcspitc this fact it seems obvious that there
would have bee n public backlash had they not resigned (Globe and Mai l llJ(5 ). "Other
w ntrove rsies" was the leastlethalo f thes eandal eategorics (honour ratio O. 1( 4). Thi s maybe
somewhat misleading. This cate gory act s us a catch -all for those issues that do not EIIl into other
catcgorics. but largely involves eases that may have been a fi nanciul or scxuul scandal. Inn for
some reason did not adequ ately tit either category. Examples include Ilclcna Gucrgis'
(Conservative. 40'" Parliament) resignation because it was rclatcd to u poorly dcfin cd scandal or
Hcv Oda (Conservative , 40'" Pnrliamcnn .bccausc it pertained to doctoring a memo whic h was
nei ther sexual nor financiully bcncficial 10 her.
The least lethal group of reasons are the tradition al individual ministerial respon sibilit y
categories. They include personal error, performan ce, and departm ental crro r. Personal error
was the most lethal of the three, though a minister who has made an crror should not fccl that shc
is in danger of serious reprisal (honour ratio 0.( 56). (Jerr y Ritz (Conservativc, Y)''' Parliament)
received cri ticism for maki ng a joke about the Listeria outbreak in 200X. A more likely penalty
would be a shu ffle to a lower position or out ofcabinet at a later da te. l' cr formancc issues imply
longer term probl ems with a minister; that is one that is prone to error (honour ratioO .().'X). An
alternat ive measure would be to count calls for resignation for each minister and designate any
minister exceeding a certain number ofca lls to be erro r prone. The method used here is
prd cr able beeauseministerswho havcreecived manyea llsf iJrre signation may also be the most
tale nted and thus were given difficult portfol ios that tend to draw ncgativc atrcntionIt should bc
noted howevcr that it is difticu lt to aecurately distinguish between a eall forre signat ion based on
a personal error that is the latest ofa string, such as l lclcna Gucrgis. and allJini sterf(Jreedto
resign based on the string of persona! crror s. xuch as Maximc Bcrnier( Conserva tivc. 40'"
l'arl i amcnt ) . The differen c e in this analysis. though not numcri c ull y s ig n i f i c u nt.j s that th c c a l l
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mustpromi ncntlyfcat urc rdc rcneetothc long standing stringofcrrors. Finallydcpartrncntal
error produced no resignations (honour ratio 0). An example would be Gerry Ritz ' s department
not adequatcly controlling to prcvClltt hc Listcriaoutbrcak. Thc jokc rcccivcd a highcr lcvcl of
media cove rage than the department based blame,
The traditional individual ministerial responsibility group docs not represent risk to the
primc ministcrofa rivaltakin g his plaec,i t docs howcvcr spcaktll plltClltial lllsscsinpuhlie
support and traditional norms of individual ministeria l rcsponsihility.Strangcly, hcing proncto
attracting calls for rcsignution docs not seem to incrcasc thc likclihood that a rninistcrw ill hc
force to resign as a result. Some examples include : Allan Rock (Liberal, J 5' I1-J i ll Parliament)
received Xcalls for resignation over 7 years or Donald Fleming's (Liberal, 24'11Parliament) X
calls for rcsignation ovcr L ycars. Thc!:let thatn ll ministcrhash ad tllr csignlllr thc conduet llf
herde partment spcaksvll lumcs tll thc pllwcrllf thc traditillnal nlltillnllf individual ministcrial
responsibi lity in Canada. Canada was not a country when the golden era of the minisrcr occurrcd
(Franks !lJX7). ln fact it cndcd in lxo" . Asa rcsult,t his convcntilln may nllt ha"c dcvclllpcd in
the miuds ofp arliamcnrarians. the media or the public, Furthermore, prime ministers responding
to calls !IJrrc signatillnw as nllt rcmlltclycommllnu ntil llJ6J .l. A dceadcl atcr sawlhecxpansion
of thceivi ls crvice whieh would rcndcra ny praetieal idca that a ministcr could prediet and
prevent any problem arising within the department untenable. Th is dcmonstratcs that thc puhlic
may have rational expectations ofw hat a minister can actual dot o prcvcnt problems arising from
withint hc dcpartmcnt. lt sccms tll hc undcrstoodt hate alls torrcsignution and/or making errors
arc not that serious in the eyes of the public or the prime minister. The public Illay simply expect
' Between 1945-1962 there w ere only 2 resignat ions of which only t was associated wi th a call for resignat ion.
Both were in 1945 short ly afte r th e end of th e Second World War.
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ministers and departments to make errors and are forgiving ofr hcm or at least do not noticc. The
high turnover in the Canadian Parliament may also keep the population ofpote ntial ministers in
the governing party low enough that unless there is very good reason, the prime minister would
prefer to avoid losing a minister ifpos sible (Kerby 2( 09). This may be particularly true in the
eyentt hata lllinister is frolll a province witha low nulllber of MPs, or in a minority goverument
situation. Both situations would dramatically reduce the number of potential replacements.
It seems that ministers tend to resign when they challenge the prime minister or engage in
a serious scandal. Though exceptions do exist, ministers do not seem to be held to account for:
( I ) smallerp ersonal errors, (2) being error prone, or(J) the actions of their departments. In
Canada, potential ministers may not be those who are good at administering or directing a
department, but often will be those who will not cause a scandal or challcngc rhc prime minister.
Typology
An assumption underlyingth ermostatic rcsponsiveness in ministcrial resignations is that
they occur to restore losses in public support. Unfo rtunately for this model resignations do not
always follow calls for resignation. The rcsignation/nonrcsignation dichotomy may require
furth er analysis. As such, a typology of resignation issucs has bccn crcatcd to allow for
distinction between resignations that occur after a call for resignation has been made and those
that occur without such a call. Figure I illustrates this typology.
FiJ,:urr I TypohlJ,:yof l{rs iJ,:nation lss urs
Resignati on
Y.:s
Tvpc I
Call for Resignution
Y.:s
(not res ignation issue)
Tvpe-!
(No nre sig na tion}
(Resig na tio n}
(\'p c3
(Resigna tion }
Type I is dd i n.:d as no.:a ll h.:ing mad.: and nos ubs.:qu.:nt r.:signation. Most days.
months. orq uartcrs can be described this way. The lack ofca lls forr csignation und lack of
r.:signationsismostp rcvak nti n th.:s ummcr months wh.:n Parliam.:nt do.:s not sit and in the
months leading up to elections, In the months leading up to elections attention tilCUSCS away
from ministers and towards the governing party or prime minister himsclf In turn with elections
winding up and government activity winding down, it is not the time to force the resignation of a
minister . This could act as a lightning rod for unwanted attention when changes of support till'
th.:g ovcrning party ar.: most important.
Typ.:2isar.:signationwit houtp riorca ll for resignation. Th is kind can be difficult to
interpret. It is more l ikely to be the result ofi nternal political mutters, But. it can also be that a
r.:signationocc urr.:d that had b.:.:n r.:ccivingc ov.:rag':, hut noc aII had been made yd . The fi rst
incid.:nc.: is morc lik.:ly not to filllow th.:i ntcrnal logic of th.: calI-th.:n-rcsign situation b.:caus.:
th.:r .:signationlikcly ak rtcdth.:pub lict ot hcproh l.:mandthus causcd alossinpublic support.
The latter type should be more like a low covcragc Typc Z resignation and should still have the
same effec t. For these rea son s. the T ype 2 resigna tion ma y not be exp ected to fo llowt hc intc rnal
logic o f the OLS regre ssio n. Consequently. 13 o f the 2 1 resignations in the OLS regre ssion may
not eve n be va lid .
Type 3 is an even t whe re the re has bee n a ca ll for resi gnation an d a resignatio n has
fo llowed, Thi s type is the kind described by Dewan and Dowd ing (200 5 ) and mo tivate s their
theory . A call fiJr res ignationsignilies a pro b k m ingove rnment thatshould res u lt in the loss of
publ ic support. Th e subsequent resi gnation indicates 10 the publi c that the problem has been
co rrected . The result is tha t the government 's pop ularit y should be restore d labe lled by Dewan
and Dowd ing as a cor rec t ive effec t. Th e amo unt ofcoverage received by the resi gn ati on issue
should affe ct thi s relatio nship. Low cove rage ca lls for resig na tio n ma y reflect iss ues
un imp ort ant to most people or unrea d by most peop le. The resultin g impact on public suppor t
shou ld thus be rever sed . A res ulting resi gnat ion would draw high co vera ge and ma y have the
imp act of lowering public suppor t.
Type 4 is a call for rcsig nutio n w itho ut a subseque nt resig natio n. A lso rc fcrrcd to as u
non rcsign ation , thi s is the most co mmo n type of resig na tion issue .
Type s2and 3areimporta nttocons iderlilrpurposesofunithomoge ne ity. If Type 2
repre sent s cas es where losses of publi c suppor t would havc occ urrcd with out the res ignati on .
then the uni ts may rema in homo genou s. Il owever. T ype 2 may a lso represent cases w here thc
resignati on is the first sign to the public that a minister was af fcctcd by any thing . Th is wo uld
challeng e the assumption of unit hom ogen eit y.
The following variables are facto rs that may affect a prime ministcr 's dccision to fo rce a
resignation. If there is snbstantial difference in the honour ratios oft he attributes of these
variables. then they should be considered as controls in a gove rnrncnt rcsponsivcness rcgrcssion.
Party
The particular party in govcrmncnt may have an impact on a prime ministcrs willingncss
to force a cabinet ministe r to resign. A party that has a socially conservative base ofsupport may
be less forgiv ing ofs exual scandal than a party with a liberal idcologica l basc ofsupport. A
party with a Canadian populist ideological base would be more nntrustingof a Hay Street or
Ottawa-based leader (Campbe ll and Christian 1996). Financial scandal maybe less tolerable to
this base ofsupport. Conscqucntly. jhc Progressivc Conservativc pan y or later Conservative
party ( from here on both will be ealledthe Conservativeparty)whosebaseof supportindnded
social conservatives and popul ists may theref ore be more willing to force the resignation of
ministers eanghtin seandal.Onthe otherhand.theymayd enyp otential allegations of seandal
where possible to avoid legitimizing these claims and thus protect ministers from resignation.
Thongh lhedireetionisn otpredietable.partyma y impaetmin isterialresignations.
From 1945 t0 2011. the Conservative party has an hononrratioofO.I Jland the Liberal
partyO.141. These ratios arc based on 292 observalions: 170 resignation issues for the Liberal
party and 122 fo r the Conservative party. This suggests that the particular party that governs does
not snbstantialim pactmin isteria lre signations.
l' runc Min istcr
O thcrtha n pa rty,cach pr imc mi nistcrpcrso na lly p lays arolc indccidi ng whichmi nistcrs
arc forced to resign and whi ch arc not (Page 1990) , Th ough there is limit cd variabilit y in the
honourra tiosof mos tpri mc mi nistcrsthisvariablc is worth furthe r co ns ide ration. l-irst .thc
prim e mi nister is the individua l who decid es whe ther or no t a mi nister resigns (Savoie 2(10),
Thcpcrsonalityandidiosyncrasicsofcachprimcministcrmayplayavcryimportantro1cinthc
rclationshipbctwccnrcsignationissucsandactua lrcsigna tio ns ,Furthcr,i tprovidcsintlll'lnation
abo ut the effec t ofti me perio d on res igna tions. As eac h prime m inister go verns fora s peci fic
time frumc.c hangcs in honour rati os that occur chro no log ically 0 vc r tim c ma y be see n throu gh
cxumi ning pri mc m ini ster hon our rat ios,
Prime Mini sters Mackenzie King and LonisSt. Laurcntshonl dbcconsidcrc dti rstand
perh ap s in isolation ofthe rest . It is co nceived that prior to 1963 thc purty systcm in Ca nada was
suc h that part ics wcrc dom inatcd not j ust by primc m inistcrs, but by mi nisters wh o acte d as
reg ional bos scs( Bakv is 1991 ). Th cscminist crswcrcrcsp on sib 1c fo r ens uring publi c suppor t to r
region s they repr esent ed . Th is ma y be the lust vcs tig c oft hc prcp art y faction peri od o f Canad ian
l' arliumcnt , but it has implications forresp on siven ess in rcsi gnations. Th e re we re fewcall s for
rcsignationthlm l9 45 -1960andcvcn fewerresignations . There were two in 1945 whic h sho uld
bcconsidcrcdcxccptionsas thcyoccurrcdinthcsamc ycarasthcSccond Worl d \Varcndcd.
This period was characterized wit h heavy tu rmoil as the eco nom y whi ch was ncar ly complctcl y
controllcd by thcgovcrn mc ntwast ra ns it io ning back into pr ivatc hands (Bo thwc Il2007) . There
wcrc a lsomassiv crcsourcccommitmcntsmadcby go vcrnmcnt. Th c govcrnrucnt had prom ised
Illassivc ho usi ngconstruc tion,bcnditsllll'rct urni ngso idicrsand ex po rts to devasta ted a llies
(F inkdI2006). At the same time, they promised rcprivatisat ion of major industrics. The result
was inadequate improvements in the lives of many Canadia ns causing large scale strikes and
unrest, inadequa te distr ibution of basic commodities to Canadians, inadequate housing
development and an unsatisfied internat iona l community (Finke 112(06) . To add to matter s it
was not unlike ministers to ca ll people and groups who troubled them stupid ttrLcary 1()46 ).
Despite this , there were nearly no resignation s at a ll. St.Laurent' s bonourratiowasO,despi te 20
ca lls for rcsignatiun. Thi s hono ur ratio was only shared with Prime Ministers Joe Clark and Kim
Campbell who had only one call eac h in their short tenures, whereas St. Laurent was prime
minis ter for nearly ten years .
A turning point occurred in the early 1960s when calls for resignation and then actual
resignations increased dramatically. Thou gh honour ratios remain low, compare d to their nitcd
Kingdom counterpart s (Dowding and Kang I99l'), they did increase with some variance among
prirnc ministcrs aftcr St . Laurent. Ofthis latcr timcframc Martin had the highest honour ratio
(0.250l , though only based on l' events, and l larpcr thc lowest (0.097) . Projecting an image ofa
new party and new leaders hip was paramount to maintaining thcirp ublic support as thc
Spo nsorship Scandal was looming and an image ofcleaning house would help sepa rate Martin
from the previous leader, but his short tenure makes too much infcrcnee unwise. Strangel y
enough Stephen l larpcr. who was elected partly in response to the corruption oft hc Libcral
gove rnment (Gidcngil, Blais, Everitt, Fourncir and cvittc 20(6) , did not diffcrcnti atc himscltby
mainta iningahigh honour rat io. lnf ;lcthe didt heopposite.Of 3 1resi gnationissues, I Iarper
on ly had the resignation of three ministers. Maximo Bernier was the onl y minister forced to
resignoverre peatedca lls -evcntllallystepping downbecallseofa scandal in which he lcfl
sensitive docume nts at his girlfriend's house; a woman who had connections to criminal biker
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gangs (Lclslanc 200X). Ilclcna Gucrgis. an unpopular Member ofP arliament within thc party
who was involved ina largcscandal was also forced to resign. lt involvcd ullcgutiuns of
intlucncc scllinga nd lcwdbchaviour. ncithcrof whichwo uld bc populari na party with deep
social conservative tics (Campbell and Christian 1( 95). Finally Michael Chong (Conservative.
.w'"Parliament) rcsigncdducto policy disagrccmc nt with the Quebee as a nation issue. Mr.
Chong fel t this was not acceptab le in a mult icultural socicty; u feelin g supported in the party's
western base as well as Ontario . As a young MI' he would have plenty of career left to recover
trom a rcsignatio nducto policydisagrccmcnt with the prime ministcr. At J5.Chong likcly has
plenty ofcareer time len to eventually regain a cabinet position.
Ge nde r
Givcnt hc low numbcrof womcn rcprcscntcd in thcgo vcrning partics inC anadian
I'arliamcnts.ministcrswhoarcwomcn shou ldhavcincrcascdprotcct ion from resignatio ns. The
honour ratio olwomcn and men were separated to determine whether or not it was in fact lower
forwomen . Surprisinglyt hc honourra tios t(Jrbo th gcndcrs wcrci dcntical0 . 125 forwomen and
0.125 formen . Perhaps this should not come us a surprise. Trimble and Arscott (200J)indicatc
thatthcrci s apcrccivcd scnscthatwomcn havcrcachcdcqualityand improving representation in
thc l lousc or cabinct is no longer necessary. This would account for why there would be little
puhlicba cklasht(Jr Eliling toc nsurc hightCmalcrcprcscntationi ncabi nct.On lya cabinctwith
no women at all. or close to it. would draw negative public attention.
Thc govcrn mcnt hasa na ltcrnativcmcchanismto kccp at least some women incahi ncl.
Women arc often relegated to lower level cabinet portfolios, often as Ministers ofState or
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Secretaries ofState. Th.:s.:positio nsar,:wlInt.:din.:abin.:t.bUlwolildrardydrawpllbli .:
att.:ntionor s.:rutinyaslh.:yt':IH.Jtolll<:lIsonissll.:sof p.:r.:.:iy.:d limit.:dimportan.:.:. h.:n.:.:th.:ir
lower cabinet status. The result would be that for the lew women who enter important or
controversial portfolios there would be no additional protection from resignation , With a lew low
rankingwom<:IJin.:abinct .t hc prim.:m inist.:rwo lild notbc limit.:dbygcnd.:ri nt h.: s.:k': lionof
a replacement for the affected female minister. The prime minister thus has an equal numbero f
possible replacements for an affected malc or female minister, so the women in cabinet have the
same honour ratio as the men.
Gov.:rnm.:nt Statlls (Majority/Minority)
Gove rnment status provide s an interestin g point to consider. "lh c conditions ofm inority
government arc very di fferent than that ofmajority govcmmcut. A majority government has a
majoradvantag.:whc nwnsid.:ringhowto d.:alw ithaminist.:rafte.:t.:d by.: allsf llrr.: signation.
Calls lorresignation that occur early in a majority term that threaten the support forthe
gow rnmcnt .:an b.: wait.:d ollt giving thc pllbli.: many y.:ars to fllrg.:t abolit thc issllc bctlJrc th.:
next election. Conscqucntly. u prime minister may have a greaterc apacity to extcndt hc
protcction ufc abinct solidarity ovcr an affected minister (Mel.ca y 20()l)). In a minority
gow rnm.:nl. th.: opposition .:an opportllnisti.:ally dd eat th.: govcmm.:nt if th.:g oy.:rning party·s
support is low and clcctural prospect s tllrl hcopposition look good( RlisscIl 200X). Th is would
indkatcthatamajority govc rnm.:nts holild havca low.:r honour ratio.On thco th.:rha nd.a
majoritygovcrnm.:nta lso has a largn.:all':lIs and thlisa larg.:r poolof pot.:ntialr .:pla.:cm.:nts IIJr
afte.:t.:dministns.t hllsonc lcssco nstrainto na prim.:mi nist.:r·s.: hoicc tofl lr.:.:t h.: r.:signation.
The honour ratios do indicate a substantial difference between minority(0. IX2)an d
majority government (0.109). It would seem that despite the prime minister's lowered number of
potential rcplaccmcuts.f hcy find it more desirable to respond to calls for resignation during
minority governments than in majorities. This finding may in fact be stronger than it appears on
the surface, Of the 14.5 years of minority rule in Canada since 1945,I'rime Minister Harper
accounts for five and a half years. l lc has a notoriously low honour ratio, thus other prime
ministers. particularly those who governed in both minority and majority, must have been
considerably more responsive during minority governments.
Age
As Dewan and Dowding (2005) have suggested, age may be a variable which can affect a
minister 's willingness to resign. This is especially true when considering resignations based on
policy difference . The motiva tion provided by Dewan and Dowding is that older ministers have
less career left to worry about will be more prone to make ideological choices to help crea te a
personal legacy or pay back old debts than younger ministers. The motive of course being that
resignatio n is a lesserpenalty ift here arc fewer years left to take away . On the other hand,
younger ministers may also be more prone to resign over ideological issues. The motive being
that they have a longer potential career to consider. Ideological choices could be forgive n by the
primeministerovertimeandcoulda lso hclpto sureu pa nideo!ogieaI base of support by party
factio ns. Tlo uo urratios fo r age showed substantial differences in the age categories. The 65-74
category was the least affected (0.052 ) and the youngest range of 35-44 was the most affected
(0.2 11). Anexampleofeaehoee urredi nthe2000s. The young minister is representative of his
age group whereas the older. though he tits the logic presented by Dewan and Dowding. js thc
exception for his age range.
Michael Chong resigned without call in 2006 at age 35 over the issue of Quebec being
recognized as a distinct nation within Canada. As a Chinese Canadian he argued that this was
not fair to other nationalities in the country to have one elevated above the others (Spector 2( 06).
On the other end of the spectrum. Joseph Comuzzi (Libcral. Bx'" Parliament} resigned without a
call for resignation in 2005 at 72 because he opposed the same sex marriagc bill bcing promotcd
by the Martin Liberal government of the time (Valpc, Alphonso. and Seguin 2( 06). Again. such
legislation is not as popular amongst older Canadians who tend to be less socia ll y libcral than
their younger counterparts (Ncvittc 2( 02). This being said. a concentration of resignations has
occurred in ministers under 45 till-bot h ideological rcusons. but also because they seem to be
more prone to accident or scandal. On the older end of the age spectrum this docs not seem to be
the case. Comuzzi was the only minister above 63 to resign. That being said most other
ministers over that age served before 1963 and would not have been expected to resign anyway.
Provincc ofCo nsti ruc ncy
One of the most important considerations that a prime minister must makc whcn sclcctiug
cabinet ministers. other than merit perhaps. is to ensure that therc is rcprcscntation in cahinct
from nearly every province (Mallory 1971). Chretien acknowledges that when he formed his
tirst cabinet he made a list of provinces and selected the top potential ministers from each.
Difficulty arose from making selections from the provinces with the fewest elected Liberal Ml' s.
According to Chretien. the most difficult selections were from Ontario where talented Ml's were
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notgivc ncabi nctpositionsa tk r thcp rovincialrc prcscnta tivcs wcrcsck ctcd (Chretien 2(0 7).
Because ofthe low numbcr ofM l's elected to the governing party from ccrtain provinccs. fhc
representation imperative is not always ful ly met. In fact Mallory ( 1971) suggests that a
provincc rccciV<:smorc rcprcscntation from a cabinctm inistcrwhosc riding is in that province
than their entire Senate allocation combined (including Quebec and Ontario). Consequently
provinccswith tCwscats in thc l lousc of Commonswillhavc fcwp otcntial rcplaccmcnts. A
primcministcr should takcth isinto considcrationwhcn considcringtllrcing a resignation ofsuch
a minister because a replacement might be harder to find.
The results indicate that this is indeed the case. Other than New Brunswick and Prince
Edward Island. Quebec and Ontario have the highest honour ratios; 0.179 and 0.119 respectively.
I! would seem that Quebec experiences none oft he added protection that might cornc from thc
specia l province status that it rcccivcs. but all oft hc ministcriaI rcplaccability ofa highly
populated province. With the exceptions of New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. lesser
populatcdprovinccs'ministcrs do havca dditiona l protcction(tllr honour ratios sec table I ).
Whcnco nsidcringrcasonstllrrcs ignation.t hisrdationshipbccomcsinl:rcas inglyobvious.
Ncarlycvcry rcsignationt hat occurrcdinthclowcr populatcd provinccscamcas arcsult
of somcscandalo rc halk ngctothc primcm inistcr. The honour ratios would have been very low
illlkc di nt h<:scprovinccs without thcscc ascs. Thctypcof issucal sobccomcsrck vant in
Quebec. Its honour ratio appcars so high bccausc thc rcsignation issucs associatcd with Quebec
tend to more heavily favour scanda l and challenges to the prime minister. This impact is most
readily noticeable prior to the form ation of the Bloc Quebecois when the scats were more readily
availabk to thc parties which could tllnll thcgovcrnmcnl.
cw Brun sw ick and Prince Edward. as pre viously stated, arc outliers . Both have low
population s, but the highe st honou r ratio s. It isunclcar cxactl ywhythismight bct hc casc. It
see ms mos t likel y that the low number of eve nts, 7 and 2 respec tively, mak es det erm ining rates
fairly mea ning less. Eve n I rcsignati on drama ticall y altcr sthc rat ioi n ci thcr provincc.
Specu lati ng as to wh y these provin ces ma y be differ ent than the other s is prem ature : more
observa tions arc needed.
Th e d iscussion of potcntia l relevant variables has illumi nated 4 which may he use ful
co ntro l var iables for govc m mcnt respon siveness. Thcyarc agc , prov inccofconst ituc ncy. rca son
torrcsignat ion.u nd government status. Chaptcr 4 will thus cons ist o f substitutc rcg rcss ion
ana lyses for the T hermos ta tic Model. In doin g so Dcw an and Dowd ing ' s (2005) ana lysis will he
rep licate d in Ca nada. Thi smod cl w ill substit utc t(lrpubl icrcsponsivcn css and an addi tional
rcgrcssionmodcl wi llbc propo scd l(Jr go vcrnmcntrcspo nsivc ncss.
CII 4 QUA T1TATIVE A ALYSIS
Regression Methods and Results
Responsiveness literature has made heavy usc of regression analysis in measuring
whether or not govc rmncnt outputs arc responsive to public opinion (Bartels 199 1: Burstein
2003: Manza and Cook 2002: Stimson 1991 ) and in turn whether or not public opinion is
responsive to government outputs (Wlczicn 1995: Soroka and Wlczicn 2( 05) . The data
collec tion for these studies has not been problematic because long-term collection of public
opinion on certain salient issues and domains is available. Further, measures of government
action such as voting records, j udicial decisions, government spending, and decrees have also
been collected over decades. Time-series regression analysis can be conducted to determine if a
correlation exists and provide insight into causal relationships between variables. lfpu blic
opin ion changes directionally, followed hy - after a short time lapse - a government output
change in magnitude and/or direction, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there is a causal
link. Control variables will be used to strengthen the regression model, The government's
responsiveness to very specific policy preference or general ideological trends can thus be
established. and the opinion-policy link can be accepted or rejected in narrow or broad terms .
The thermostatic model adds a measure of public opinion responsiveness to government
output. Th is relationship is harder to measure, Soroka and Wlczicn (20 I0 ) have done so by
collecting public opinion data concerning whether or not the public would pre fer more or less
spending in a broad policy area, Actual government spending can then he measured allowing
fur a determination in whether or not govcrnmcnr output responded to public opinion. In turn, by
reversing the operation and creating a time lag between government spending and public
opinion. the impact ofspending changes on puhl ic opinion can be determ ined, ln fact, Soroka
and Wlezic n (20 10) lin d that not only do policy respo nsiveness and public rcspon sivc ncss occur,
hut they vary from state to state based on institutional characteristics. The more these
charactcristicsb lurt hc lincs ofaccountahility. thcless rcsponsivc thc puhlic and govc rnmcntarc.
The Soro ka and Wlczicn (20 10) model for policy respon siveness is defin ed as follows:
I1Pt = p + y l Rt -1+ y2Gt- 1+ III
Where ( I1Pt) is changes in policy in ycar t, (p ) is the intercept and (lit) is thc crrort cnn.
(y l/?t- / ) ispuhlicpolicyprefcrcncc fromt hc prcvio us unitofti mca nd(y2Gt - l)is thc
govcrning pal1y control tiJnll thc prcvious timc pcriod.
Thc puhlicrcsponsivcncss lim nula is defincd as follows:
Rt = cr+ IJI Pt + fJ2Wt +e t
Whcrc (Rt )is thcpuhlic·srdativcprefcrcncc.(cr) is the intercept and (e t ) thccrrortcrm.(/{l/ ' t)
thcactuallevc lofpolicyand(/J2 Wt)a sct ofcontro lva riahles.
A scrious prohlemcxistswhcnattcmptingto usc this mcthodo logyi nt hc studyof
minister ial resignat ions. Most importantly.there arc no longitudin al opinion polls mcasuring
puhlic op inion conccrnin gthcdcsirctolim:cparticularministcrstorcsign. Conscqucntl y thcrc
arcno valuc sl iJrrdativcprefcrcncc . Thc dcpcndcntvariahle isthusunmcasurcdtodatc. The
c1oscst approximation availahlei st hcovcrall lcvc lofpuhlic supportfor thc govcrnin gparty.
Unlike the Soroka and Wlczic n modcl.a rcgrcss ion modd Iorrcspnnsivcncss to ministcriul
rcsignation would rcqu irc a richcr sct of control and instrtlmcntal variahles. These variables arc
require d to take into acco unt those factors whic h affec t rcsig nution issues other than pu blic
opinio n and facto rs wh ich affec t public opinion other than res ignation issucs.
Dewan and Dowdi ng (2005) have create d an ordin ary least squa res regression ana lysis
that mea sur es the impa ct of resignatio ns and non rcsignations on public support for the gove rn ing
par ty. T his method will be used in substi tution for the Soro ka and Wlc zicn publ ic
respo nsivc nessequatio n. ltconeeptua lly inco rpora tes a llt he cle ments reqlliredofthcr mos tat ie
respo ns ive ness as we ll as produ cin g resul ts that can ind icate the presence of publi c
res pons ive ness ( in the study ofrespon siveness in mini steria l rcsignatio ns. govc nunc nt
respon siv ene ss wi ll be substituted for polic y responsiveness as resigna tio ns arc not exactl y a
pol icy deci sion ). Areplaceme nt eqllatio nl i.ll'govcrnmentresponsivene sswillthenbeconsidered
consis ting of the co ntro l variables identifi ed in chapter 3. Public respon siven ess will be
considcrcd bcforc govcnuncnt respo nsiv eness to hclp co ntc xtua lizc the ro le of public opinio n in
the deeision tofi.JITea minist er to resig n. lk tiJrei ntroduc ilig the public respo ns iveness equ ation ,
adescripti on ofrele van t var iablc si srcq llired andhowtheytitthecritcr ialiJrtherm ostat ic
respo nsivene ss.
T he dependent variable is suppor t tiJrthe govcrni ngparty, speciticallytheirleadovcr the
mos t pop ular opposi tion par ty. Data coll ect ion fo r th is var iable was co llec ted prima rily from
Ga llllpCanada lncor por atedthro ligh O DES I. Gallup poll s co nsti tute all dat a co llecte d from
1945-20 00when Ga llup d isco ntinliedi tsCanadian pliblicopinion po lling. T he answe r to the
que stion " I f a Domi nion ele ction were held toda y, whi ch part y's cand idatc do yo u thin k you
would favour ?" from 1945 to 1975 or "l f a Fedcral e lection werchcldtoday, wh ich par ty's
ca nd ida te doyoli thinkyoli wo lild tilvourT'from l976 to200 1 was used. T his data was
suppk nH:nll:d byother publieo pinion polls frolll2 002 onward. For 2002. Environics polls wcrc
recorded for the question " If a Canadian federal election were held today. which one of the
following parties would you vote for?" . For 2003. lpsos-Rcid polling was used and for 200-1-
201 I. Angus-Reid was used. Both used the question "What party would you vote for in the next
federal election?" . The puhlic supportforthemostpop ularo ppositionp artywas suhtractedfrolll
that of the governing partyPublic support is calculated quarterly.
The primary independent variables are " resignation issues". Resignation issues have two
possihk llmn s:resignationsa nd resignation issues. The lateris the sum of resignations and
nonrcsignat ions, To fully capture the impact of resignations on support forthe governing party it
is also essential to record when resignations could have happened as well. Though mauy
potential resignation issues may have occurred behind the closed doors ofc abinet meetings.
these events would be impossible to record and would also he unknown to the public making
them meaningkss tot hisa nalysis. Consequently. calls fllr resignation covered hy the (i lohe and
Mail from 19-15 to the end of the Harper government in 20 I I have been recorded. In the event
thata resignation occurred. it was recorded as such. In the event that a call was made and no
resignation resulted. it was recorded as a nonrcsignation.
As stated earlier. a number ofvariables other than resignation issues arc believed to
impactp uhlic supportl llr the governing party. A set of control variahk s is thus included. Dewan
and Dowding (2005) indicate that economic variables may he the most important contro l
vuriuhlcs. Though they use a set of economic variables derived frollll'i ssarides(I ')XO). these
will not he used in the Canadian case because they have not been rested in Canada. The
economic variables that have been found to affect support Illr the governingparty in Canada by
Ilappy ( llJlJ2) arc included as substitutes for those of l'issarides ( l lJXO) in the Rll So f the
regression model". Theyine lude intlation rate,unemployment,realpersonaldi sposable income,
and real personal direct taxes. These values were calculated from CANSIM tables generated by
Statistics Canada. The collection of these variahies is the limiting factorf orth e num bero f
observations used in this regression. Real personal direct taxes data range fromllJ X2-200X
making it the limiting variable on both ends of the range. The descriptive statistics for the
regression (Table 2) arc thus different than those of the qualitativc analysis which range from
IlJ45-2011.
T ABLE 2 Descrip tive Sta tis tics (OLS Regr ession Ana lys is)
Variables
Poli t ical
Resignat ions No. in quarter 0.1 94 0.04 5 21
Resignation issues No. in qu art er 1.52 0 .15 1 164
Economic
Unemp loyme nt quarte rly rat e 8.57 0.194
Infl at io n yearly rate 0.73 0.077
Real disposable Incom e average quart erly percent change 0 .124 0.00 2
Real direct taxes average quart erly percent change 0 .066 0 .00 6
Politi cal
Quart ers t o near est
elect ion Quart er ly 3.83 2.8 1 108
Term s in office Quart erly 1.78 2.6 108
Age average age in quarter 51.1 0.733
Age squared average squared age in quart er 2653 74 .9
Notes: Dcscriptivc stalistil:sfor lhc "Lihcral inpo wcr"a nd "atw ar"var iahlcs havc llot hcc n inrhllkdh cc:llISClhL" Y
are d icho tomou s variab les and thus mean and standard deviat ion orlcr liule usc ful information.
' Happy (1992) is an at t empt t o replicate comparable f indings to Pissardes (l 980) for the Canadian context . For
that reason Happy's economic var iables are used in this study.
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Further. a group of politicaI variables have been included as control variables that may
impact support for the govcrmucnt. These variables were derived from Dewan and Dowding.
(2005) They include the number of quarters to the nearest election. a Liberal government in
power dumm y variable, the number of consecutive terms in office. and a dummy variable
indicating if the country is at war. The quarters to the nearest election should account till'
midterm blues that cause a drop in support fo r the governing party between elections. Liberals in
power indicates the impact of the dominant political party holding office which is predicted to
potentially reduce the impact of resignation issues. "Consecutive terms in office" is included
because it is predicted that in time governing parties losc support. Finally. governing parties
may experience a lowering of public support during war time during an unpopular war or
protection during war time if the war is deemed essential (Dewan and Dowdin g 2( 05 ).
The regression model fo l lows:
L'I= I ' a c(ECO ;'1) + U1(I'OLi'l)+ a~ ( RES'I ) + a ,( RES.JSSUE'I) + a ,,(IICRES. ISSUE'I)+
a 7(RES'I*RES.ISSUE'I) + a ,(RES'I*IICRES.ISSUE'!) + II,!
The dependent variable. L". is the govcming partys lead over the most popu lar
oppos ition party. ECON,,!is the group ofeco nometrics that have been found to intlucncc support
tiJr the governing party. I'OLi'listhegroupo f political variables that have been found to aff ect
the popularity of the governing party. RES,!is the number of resignations that occuri n a given
quarter. RES.ISSUE'I is the quarterly number of resignation issues. IJCRES.ISSUE'Iis a dummy
variable where I indicates that a high coverage resignation issues has occurred within a givcn
quarter and 0 that no high coverage event has occurred. RES/R ES.ISSUEq is the interaction
between quarterly resignations and quarterly resignation issues. RES/I ICRES.ISSUEq is the
interaction between quarterly resignations and a dummy variable indicating if a high coverage
issue has taken place in that quarter./I 'li san error term. To control for fi rst-order serial
corre lation. L'I'(!' ll willbe added tothe right hands idc of the equation'.
The logic of how this model can substitute forth e thermostatic model used by Soroka and
Wlczicn (20 10l may not be obvious, but it does measure the relationship between public opinion
and a government output, Most clearly, the government' s willingness to force a minister to
resign or not is analogous to policy output. lf'thc govcrumcnt forces resignations when it
perceives that the public wants resignations. then it can be said to be responsive in minister ial
resignation . The public ' s support fill' the governing party fluctuates based on a number of
variables including responsiveness in ministerial resignations. This model accounts lorthose
other variables and thus can demonstrate whether or not the public is responsive to government
outputs in ministerial resignations. The signal to the government that the public wants a
resignationisbroadcastt hrough the mediai nt he fimnofacallfi Jr resignation, The strength of
thissig nal is rd lectedi n the degreeofwve rage it reeeives. To thar cndurticlcs in thc Globc
and Mail that receive first page coverage, that are editorials, or have a word count grcntcrt hun
1000, are coded as high coverage. Inturn , anydec isionb ythe government tol ilrce are signation
is signalled to the public through media cove rage as well.
Public responsiveness is measured through the rcgrcssion cocffic icnts otrcsignarion
issues. resignations, and their interactions. They would indicate whether or not (and in what
direction ) the public responds to the government's choice to forcc a resignation when a call has
been made.
' hime t-l refe rs to the previous quarte r.
Tahk 3illustratcsthcrcsults oft hc rcgrcssionwith thc rcsignatillndfcd s.cCOnllmic
variables and quart ers to the nearest election (I). with a control for first-o rderseria l correlatio n
(2). and with a ll control variables derived from Dewan and Dowding (2005 ) and their Canadia n
cquiva lcnts tI) ".
Thc llnly sign ilic antrcsultswcrct lJUnd in the serial correlatio ns term (p<.05).which
indicatcst hatthc dcpcndcnt variahkcorrd atcswithi tsc lfllv crtimc. No other significant results
havcbccn llllll1d llJr publicrcspllnsivcncss. Dcwa na nd [)owding( 20( 5) also include
instrtlmcntal variabks llfa gc andagc squarcd as wcll as anumbcr of stat isticst o cnsurcthc
significa nce ofthe lindings havc nllt bccn biascd duc tll first and sccond ordcrs crial corrcluti on.
IV estimates were conducted using age and age squared which produ ced grcatcrs ignificancc. Iiut
again no significant result was obtained. As a result, further measures off irs t and second order
scrial co rrclation wcrc not conductcd as thcy would onlys crvc !o furthcr rcducc significancc.
Gove rnment responsiveness may still occur. though it seems unlikcly ift hcrc is no puhlic
rcsponsivc ncss to drivc it. (Jovcrnmcnt rcsponsivcncss dllcs sccm tooccur!osomccxtcntas
seen throught hc cak ulationof hllnour ratios. With 164 resignation issues and 21 resignations:
thc ovcralihonourratioin Canadafroml lJX2-200X isO.12X. This indicates that the government
is responsive 12.X'X,ofth c timc. However. these honour rat ios arc rather simple and may miss
thcundcrlying motivcsof rcsignation.
Whcrcpublic opini onwasnot! lllllJd tobcrcsponsivct o rcsignation issucs.thc
govcrnmcnt would havc no inccntivc to !llrccrcsignationsductothcpcrccpti on resignation
issues. An ordinary least squares regression has thus been conducted to dctermin e ifchan ges
bAn OLSregression was conducte d with out economic variables with no signif icant result s.
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Tub le J OL S Estimates of Resignalion Effects on Governing 1':II·ty Popularity
(1) (2) (3)
dependent variable (t -1) 0.766 0.612
(0.067) (0.086)
Resignation Issue Effects
Resignat ion s -18.867 -2.674 -1.643
(20.702) (13.559) (13.225)
resignat ion issues 1.691 1.192 1.204
(1.956) (1.275 ) (1.239)
high coverage issue dummy -2.686 -0.650 -1.156
(5.016) (3.272) (3.197)
-1.423 -0.796 -0.132
(2.641) (1.721) (1.683)
res*h igh coverage resissue 23.668 3.889 1.765
(20.498) (13.463) (13.121)
Economic Effects
unemp loyment rate -2.974 -0.064 -1.372
(0.974) (0.683) (0.897)
-3.471 -2.733 -2.545
(2.727) (1.778) (1.739)
real disposable income 41.308 112.004 80.629
(126.474) (82.617) (80.813)
real perso nal direct tax -72.961 -30.802 -47.911
(31.875) (21.084) (22.461)
Polit ical Effects
quarters to nearest elect ion -0.336 -0.224 -0.084
(0.829) (0.540) (0.528)
-4.016
(1.771)
liberal in power 9.267
(3.355)
-0.276
(3.489)
R squared 0.707583 0.678 0.233
Observat ions 108 108 108
Notes: Sta ndar d errors arc provided in parcuthcsc s. S ignilkancc is pro vided in ita lics
inpuhlicopinion ca usc ministcria l rcsignationsto occ ur. The fo llowi ng equatio n substitutes for
thc T hcmos tatic l'vlodd·sgovcrnmc nt rcs po ns ivcncss cquation.
WhcrcRcs q isthcnumhcr ofrcsignation sinaquartcr. Lq is the percen t lead in suppor t lorthe
governing party. a I is the interce pt and /1'1 is the erro r term . CO Vq is a dum my lo r high cove rage
eve nts. REAS q is a dumm y variable wher e I is a high probabi lity ofr es ignation. All rcas uns for
resig nat ion which achie ved an honour ratio of 0. 1 or higher arc co nsidcrcd high probab ility.
Thc sccvcntsinc ludc sca nda lsand d ircclcha llcngcsto lhc pr imc ministcr. PROV q is adummy
variabl e whe re I is assigned to Ontario and Qu ebec as pro vinc es with man y potenti a I
replacem ent min isters. AG Eqi s thc agcof a fli:ctcdmi nistcrsat thc timcoft hccvcnt. Possible
co ntro l varia bles, as discussed in chaptcr J , have been omitted fromt his model becau se they
were demonstrated to hav e lill ie imp act on resignat ions. Resu lts ca n be seen in Ta blc -l,
Ta hle 4 OLS Estimates of Var iahles o n J{esign;ll io lls
COVq 0.197
(0.043)
REASq 0.189691
(0 .044)
PROV" 0.0277 83
(0.044)
AGE'I -0 .004 17
(0.00 3)
-0 .00065
(0.00 1)
R Square
NOlt's:Slandard c rrorsa rc pfO\'idcd in parcnthcs is . SignilicallL"c is providcdi ni talics.
Hccausc the honour ratios were used to define the contro l variables in the government
rcsponsivcncss cquations.Jt is not surprising that some oft hem were significant. MOI"l:
importantly, the OLS rl:grl:ssionl: quationtkmonstratl:st hat publie opinion docs not affect the
priml: ministl:rsdlOkl:toforl: l:mi nistl:rstorl:sign. lnstcad. the reason for rcsign.uion und thc
kV1:1of cow ragI:were the only factors that were significant at (p<.05). The significant results of
rl:asonl ill'rl:si gnation indil:atl:t hat thl:t ypil:alco lKl:ptionsof individual ministl:rial
responsibility, ministerial I:ITOr.departme ntal error, and performance arc significantly less lethal
than sl:andal ordlalknging thl:priml:ministl:r. Further, high coverage ofan event means it is
signifk antly mOl"l: likl:ly that thl: l:w nt will rl:sult in a rl:signation. lts hould bl: notl:d howl:vl:r
thata gl:wa s nl:arlys ignitkant andt hl:rl:is spl:w lation thato ltk r ministl:rs may also he more
pronl:t o rl:signwhkhwouldcountl:ral:tsoml:ofthl:prl:didl:dtindingsthat youngl:rmini stl:rs
will be more prone to resign,
Discussion
Dewan and Dowding' s prediction that finding the correc tive effect in ministerial
rl:signat ionsmay bl:ditlkulti no tlwrl:o ulllrkshasprown trul:,o utpI: rhapsnot lill·t hl:p lTdil:tl:d
reasons, They suggested that institutional considerations such as party systems creating
l:oalitionsOl"whl:rl:l: ka r linl:s of rl:sponsibility from cabinet ministcr to primc ministcr urc not so
strong may make this relationship unclear. Canada should haw presented the most ideal country
torl:plkatl:thisworkand produl:l:s imilar lindings;llOWl:vl:rt hiswas not the case,
The reason may simply have been that data coIIcction ofre levant variables in Canada has
not produced thl: quantity of oosl:rvations nl:l:tk d to generate significant findings. From 19X:! to
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200X there were only lOXobserved quarters including IX3ealls for resignat ion and 21
resignations. These num bers arc small, especiall y conside ring that so many variab les affect
public support for the govcrning purty and so many variables affec t the decision to force a
resignation. Even after removi ng varia bles shown to be irrelevant and adding new control
variables. resignations. resignatio n issues. and their interaction s do not prod uce signific ant
results.
A second reason that no significant e ffect was discovered cou ld he that that the model
pntimlled appropriatd y.butt hat govc rnmcntr espo nsiw nessor public responsivcncssi s
inadequate to drive a thermo static relationsh ip. To explore this we must consider the 4 clements
ofthcrmostutic rcsponsivc ncss: public opinion change, signal to thc govcrmucntvgovcrnmcnt
output . and signal to the public.
The signal strength to the government may fir st come into question. Given that public
opinion polls in Canada haw been administered inconsistently and sporudically uutil thc mid
1')70s, the gov ernment 's ability to usc them to measure public opi nion may be called into
question. Thi s explanation may be more useful prior to the mid I970s, but most of this research
filcuses on atimeframcwhcrcpublicopinion hasbccn mcasurcdwnsistcntly. The signal to the
govcm mcnt docs not necessarily come from public opinio n polls ask ing about general support
fi.Jr thc govcrIlingparty.butrathcrthccalls fi.lr rcsignationthcmsd vcs. The se calls arc defin ed as
being made pub licly in The Globe and Mail (and presumabl y in a rangc ofot hcr mcdia as wcll)
and arc thus unl ikely to have been ove rlooked by the prime minister who would have known the
public was also rcadingthc covcragc of thosc cvcnts. As Soroka and Wlczicn (20 10) have also
idcntifi cd.this signalwmcsin thc fi.JI"Illofa varictyofcommuniqucs fro III constituents as well,
Thus there is little reason to doubt the signal to the government at least in thc form ofmc dia
coverage if not polls.
The signal from the government to the public is equally as apparent. A government's
decision to force the resignation ofa cabinet minister always receives heavy covera ge in the
Globe and Mail. Evcn those ministers who resign lilr personal reasons or retirement tend to
receive considerable coverage. A public capable of signalling a problem to the government that
eanbelinked toaministerwilla isobeabletoreeeive the signal that something has been or has
not been done about the problem. Consequently, the lack of appa rent responsiveness must come
from the government' s lack of interest in responding to public opinion, or the public' s lack of
concern about this sort of response.
First. thc govcnuncnts responsiveness will be considered. A prime minister has all the
de facto power she may need to force the resignation ofa cabinet minister. In filet. of the
Westminster systems, the Canadian prime minister is the most powcrful visa vis constraints
imposedbyother party members, within l'arliamento r within the extraparliamentary party
(Weller IlJX3). Thatbeing said,f ilrein gth eresignationo faeabinetmini steris still nota
dcsirablc option. Jn thc Unitcd Kingdom, Prime Minister Antlcc has said that it is the most
distasteful decisio n a prime minister can make. a sentiment shared by most other British prime
ministers and is unlikely to be different in Canada (Alderman and Cross IlJX5). Thc utfcctcd
cabinet minister usually has considerable pride in the position and rcmoving thcm from it can bc
personally devastating for the minister who the prime minister has likely built a close
relationship with. That being said,a prime minister must fi rst protect his agency which
necessitates ensuring continued or increased public support for the governing party (Weller
IlJX5). As such. cabinet ministers arc forccd to rcsign undcr circumstanccs whcrc thcy thrcatc n
govcl"llmcnts uppol1or challcngc thc primc ministcr publically. ln thc cvcnt that the prime
ministcr pcrccivcd no public backlash froll1not forcinga ministcr to rcsign. itc ouldbc cxpcctcd
that ministers would never be forced to resign (except ifthcy challcugc the prime minister
directly). Given that they arc, government can be respon sive, out docs not seem to be reliabl y so.
Pcrhapsthcpuolicisnotadcquatclyrcspon sivc .
Thc rcspo nsivcncssofthcpuolichasoccncallcd into ques tion more heavil y than any
othcr uspcct ofr csponsivcncss. Thcrchas occn considcrahlcqucstion conccl"lling thc puhlic' s
capaci tyto tiJrlllcnduringopi nionsahout govc l"llmcntact ions(S hapiro l()()X).t hought hcrc has
been some positive analysis indicating that they do (Soroka and WIczicn2(05). l' ublic
responsiveness may be the location in this equation where thermo static respo nsiveness in
ministcr ialrcsignationhrcaksdown. lft hcpuhlici snotrcsponsivc thcrc is no motive forthe
government to be respon sive.
Thccvidcncc availablc sccm st olcadtothcassull1ption thatthcpuhlic should be
respo nsive. The public has in filctdcmonstratcdrcsponsivcncsst opolicyoutputsin salicnt
domains (Soroka andWlczicn 2010) . The limitation s in other areas often come from the fact
that thc puhlici snot adcquatcl yawarc ofcvcntsand govcl"llmcntacti viticstoliJrlll cohcrcnt
opinions and updatc thcm with ncw infimllation. This shouldnothcaprohlcmtilfll1inistcrial
resignati ons. Lowcovcragcrcsigna tion issucsmayhcovcrlookcd .and fort his reason they were
scparatcd fi·om high covcragc. l ligh covcragc cvcnts on thc othcr hand havc all thc hallmarks of
uffccting puhlic op inion. A scandal till' cxamplchasth c capacityt o captur cpuhlic attcntion and
is simplccnoughtoundcrsta nd. lfaministcrmisuscs hcrofticctiJ rpc rsonal gainorhchavcsi n
an otherwise scan da lous way the public ma y easi ly unde rstand an d rcspo nd to this , Failure to
force a res igna tion could be interpreted as co ndo ning the activity o ft hat min istcr . Co nsequent ly.
the public should be able to respo nd. Th e fac t that the pub lic docs not seem to respond may be
the result of the varie ty of reasons why ca lls arc mad e forrcsignation an d rcsignations arc
actua lly forced . Th is lead s into the third possibilit y wh y no the rmostati c rcs pons ivcncss sccms to
ex ist in minister ial resig natio n.
Th e third possible reason tha t the results were insignific an t is that res ignat ion issue s may
not be as homo genous a group as nee ded. T here arc seve ra l reason s wh y the assumpti on of uni t
homo gen eity in resigna tion issues should be question ed. First.! lll· aresign ationi ssue to pro vide
an adequate signa l to the government. it must rcccivc cno ugh mcdi a coverage to be of conce rn.
Low cove rag e of even ts should thus he rem oved. Seco nd. not a ll resig natio ns tit the expectatio n
of ca ll for res ignat ion and res po nse. Co nse quently. res ignations may not tit the logic of
res ponsiveness whereres ignations preee deaelua l me J ia cov erage . Res ignations have bee n
divided as Type 2 and T ype 3 based on this disti nct ion . In fact , a greater number ofType 2
resignations have occurred. T hatmeanst hatea lls !lJrresignatio n followed by resigna tions arc
less like ly to occur tha n resignat ions that oc curred w ithou t a prcccd ing ca ll bcin g madc .
Dewan and Dowding (:~005)presented an interestin g wa y ofdea ling wi th this prob lem .
Th ey crea ted two groups of resignat ions as wel l. They remo ved a ll resig natio ns that would have
likely bee n the fi rst the publi c heard about a prob lem ex isting, Th at is. they remo ved a ll low
cove rag e resignatio n issues and all resignati on s that first bro ught atten tion to an issue. The
remain ingresignat ioni ssues were those thatreeeive d a preeedi ngea ll llJr resignationandthose
that were co ncern ing c ircums tances that the pub lic had a lready bcc n uwarc. Dewan an d
Dowding tillllld agrcatcrco rrcctivc cffcct bascd on that defin ition ofr csignation. Unfortunately.
dividing a group of 21 resignations would result in a new group so small that significance is
almost certainly impossible to lind.
The unit homogeneity problem with ministerial resignations also calls into question the
utility ofhonourratiosas anovcrallmcasurcof govcrnmcntrcsponsivcncss. The willingness to
tillTc thc rcsignation of ministcrss ccms to lcan towards thc motivc of wcakcningc hallcngcs to
party leadership rathcrthan exclusive ly protecting against potcntial losscs in puhlic support.
There is thus a bias in the overa ll honourratio ofO. 12Xtowards grcarcr govcnuucut
rcsponsivcncsst hans houldact ually bc intcrprctcdti-OIl1this numbcr.
The dependent variable may also have been problematic. As previously stated, there arc
no consistent surveys for whether or not a ministcr should rcsign. Conscqucntly. thc pubhc may
be responsive in their desire to have a minister removed, but not so much tluu it cbangcs thcir
support forthe governi ng party. The rime lag may also have been inappropriate . Though
quarterly measurements arc the smallest interval that could have been effectively used and longer
time lags may have meant that a resignation issue has been for gott en, it is quite possible that
cachiss uc rcquircd its own uniquc timc lag. Whereas many issues disappear almost
immcdiatcl y.othcrissucsdrag onlilr ycars. Un fortunately it would not he possible to create a
modclt hatt;lcilitatcs uniquctimc lagstilrcachi ssuc.
The Canadian political culture has so 1;lr bccn ovcriookcd as a potcntial clemcn\ in this
responsiveness. It has been described that Canadians expect a lot in the way ofo utput to deal
with problems. but arc passive to its actions (Ncvittc 2( 02). That is. Canadians may be more
responsive to outputs. but arc willing to turn a hlind cyc to the activitics ott hc mcmbcrs oft hc
govcmmcnt itself Canada has a long history ofdeference to government and elites, The long
history ofBr itish wnt rol orpartwntrolin the Canadian governll1entisa sign and symptom of
this condition. A change can be seen in public opinion beginning in the 19XOs and through quite
anull1ber of signilicantpoliticalupheavalsinthel990sthatchalIengeth eseassull1ptions
( cvittc 19<)6). This is interesting as the current study primarily focussed on this time period. It
was also found that Canadians' bclicft hat thc govcrumcnt is rcsponsivc to thcir uttitudcs
declined sharply in the mid 19XOs. UnflJrtunatclyt hisbe lid' \\'ould hold for either political party.
If thepubl ieh olds suchnegatiw opin ions aboutallpolitieians.then the idea of holding ministers
to account simply to be replaced by other corrupt or inept ministers may not inspire changes of
public support for parties. Thercsultwouldbelessll1otivellJraprill1ell1inistertofllreeth eir
resignations.. lnthi st ill1e fr-nne. attitlldes wne erningpol iticald'tCct iwn ess ofthe individual and
trust\\'o rthinessofgove rnment institlltionsa ndi ndividllals began aso ll1ewhatle ngthy dedi ne.
Hclicvcd largely to be the result of highcr cducation levels and post materialism one cannot help
blltn otice thcdrall1atic inn ease in calls forresignation in the 19XOs (Nevitte 2002). The
numbers ofresignation issues in that decade were double ihc prcvious and thc ncxt. The result
was not a doublin g of actual resignations . This lack of responsi veness would ofcourse add to
public discontent.
There sults of thisd ecline inddcrence ll1ayn otb e visible in theOLSregrcssiona nalysis.
not because the public remain passive, but because resignation issues do not adequately reflect
the major issues in Canada. The very mechanism that provides the Canadian prime minister
po\\'ertoenfllrccrcsignationsll1ayalsobe\\'hatprevcntsthclltilityofthi sactionin gcnnal. The
prill1ell1inisterccntred governll1cntwhi ch hasbecndcvclopingsincetheearly 1')60sandhas
progressivelyccntrcdo n the prill1c ll1inisters incc has ll1adc thc priIl1Cministercentre of all
98
government activities and the face of government as a whole (Savoie 2(10). The prime minister
has thus become the focus ofmajor issues in Canada instead of ministers. Alderman and Cross
(19X5)s llggests thatt he publie is more thanab leto notieet hat a minister has been used asa
scapegoat and forcing their resignation may reduce support lorthe prime ministerand thus the
governing party. Consider the impact oft he lilllowingeventso np liblieopinion: Liberal
corrupt ion culminating in the Gomcr y Enquiry, the Liherallcadershipehallengeof Paul Martin,
the AFTA debate, the National Energy Policy. and the Constitution debates. These events ,
whiehhadeonside rablcimpaetonp ublies upportliJrt he governing partylile llsseda lmost
entirely on the prime minister and party. A ministerial resignation would have had little impact.
Of partielilar interestwolildbe the lcadershipe hallengeof Palil Martinagai nst .lcanC hrctien.
Despitethislengthya ndp llbliee hallcngewhiehthrea tenedt hereplitationo ft heLiberal Party,no
call tilr resignation was made against Palil Martin. Instead, the tilClis of negati\'e attention was
placed against the prime minister. When Paul Martin was linally forced to resign there was no
evideneethatthisaetionproteeteds upport lilrtheLiberals. It would seem that in Canada, the
prime minister's place of prominenee may mean that issues serious enough to dramatically affect
public opinion bypass the minister level and go straight to the primc minister. This would make
the ministeria l rcsignarion an unusablc tool to protect against serious losses in public support.
Before concludin g, a discussion of' the significant political and cconomic variables should
also he included. Ofthe economic variables that were included inth eOLSregressionanalysis
only real direct taxes achieved significance. This indicates that taxes. independent ofperceptions
ofeconomie perlilrina nee,arereeeivingse parateeonsideration by the public when choosing
which party th e y s u p p o rt. This is interesting as taxes are ra r el y reporte d by the public as an
important elcetion issue inC anada (l lappy 1992).
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Oft hc political variublcs. "terms in officc 't and vl.ibcrals in powcr't rcachcd statistical
significance. The significa nce oft he terms in office variable supports that the midterm blues
rcductioni nsu pportforthcgovcrning party rcportcdi no thcrco untricsalso occursi nCa nada
(Dewan and Dowding 2(05). The positive signific ant relationship of Liberals in power and
support for the governing should not come as a surprise. The OLS regression analysis only
includcd.3 l'rog rcssivc Conscrvativc/Conscrvativc primc ministcrs: .3yca rsof l larpcr
govcrnmcnts. thc rathcr llnpopular Mulroncy govcmmcnts. and thc short livcd Clark
government. The highly significant and positive value for thc Libcruls simply rcflccts thc
unpopularity ofCl ark and Mulroney's Progrcssivc Conscrvativc govcnuncnt s during most of
theirtenure s.
CONC LUSION
The results oft his thesis speak toa numhcr ofrc lcvant discussions in dcmocratic
rcsponsivcncss. l' irst,t hc primc ministcr docs not appcar to lixcc ministcrs to rcsign bccauscof
public opinion. Th is finding docs support the notion ofa rational and self-interested prime
minister, Af ter all. the public docs not seem to respond to resignation issucs. fhcrcforc thc
motive off uture electoral consequence has no bearing on the prime ministcrs dccisionTt also
unswcrs a question posed by Dewan and Dowding (2005), that ift he public did not respond to
rcsignation issucs, thcn why would a primc ministcr cvcr forcct hc rcsignation of a ministcr'!
Thc answcr inth c Canadian contcxti sth atth c aftCctcdministcrmust cithcrp osc ar iskl o thc
primcministcr'sagcncy aspart ylcad cr or bcin volvcdin a scrious scandal, which may be a
mat terofconvention.
Thc rcsults also spcak to thcl imits of rcsponsivcncss in Canada. All the conditions were
met for a thermostatic relationship to exist in miuistcriul resignations. but they do not. Th is isa n
intcrcstingti nding in thccontcxtofgovcrnmcnt rcsponsivcncss,b ccausc it would intuitively
sccmthatifthcrmostatic rcsponsivcncsscxists inso mcthingascomplcx as policy, then it should
cxisti nsi mplcissucs likc ministcria l crrors. l Iowcvcr. Jt docs not. This represents a limit
bcyonosalicncc inrcsponsivcncss.
Thisrcsultalso spcaks to thc dcbatcconccrning thc prcsidcntializationof thcprimc
minister. Savoie ( 1999) argues that power has centralized not only from thc purliamcnt to the
cabinet. but also from the cabinet to the prime minister. The findin gs oft his thesis seem to
support thc ultcrnativc point ofvicw presented by White (2005) and l3akvis( 2001).Thcy suggcst
that thc primc ministcr is thc boss. but has limits on hcr authority. One such limit is the
intlu.:n.:.:ofalcw pow.:rful.:a bin.:t minist.:rs. They arc needed to ensure continued party
support li.Jrth.: prim.: minist.:ra s wd l asll ftcr tak nt in administering government: a task which
the prime minister cannot conduct alone. This need for talent in the cabinet is supported by the
prime minister' s unwillingness to force the resignation ofc abinet ministers fora ll but the most
s.:rious of oftc n.:.:s sud J as tinan.:ial llr s.:xual s.:andal, or dir.:.:t .:halk ng.:s to his authority.
The primary question that remains is why would no rcsponsivcncss occur.vs pccia lly
given that in the United Kingdom,wh i<:hhas w ry similar institutions, itd o.:s'! Deferential
political culturc.u wcak historical convention of individual millist.:ria l r,:spollsibilityiIl Callada,
pooru llit honJ(lg.:n.:ity,a lld simply illad.:quat.: obs.:rvations hav.:.:a .:hb ':':llco llsid.:r.:d,but
furtherresearch is required . Th,:olll y solid colldu sionsthat .:anb.:drawll ar.:th atth .:
g':ll.:ralizability of tindings, ,:v':ll b.:tw.:.:n most similarly mat.:h.:d .:as.:s, shllUld llot be assumed
aIlJ th.: syst.:maticcolkctionofagr.:at.:ramo untofr.:kyalltCalla diall data should be made a
priority.
Futur.: r.:s.:archs houlds .:.:kto d.:t.:nn ill.: what.:xa.:t lycollstilllt.:sat hr.:at tll th.: prim.:
minister' s agency. Dir.:ct challcng.:s from within th.: party ar.: obvilluslym .:t with r.:prisal,but
giw ll that thc public do,:s llot s.:.:m to r,:spolld to r.:sigllations it is not fully clear why some
millist.:rsar.:filfc.:d to r.:sigllo y.:rs.:a llda lsa lldo th.:rsa r': llot. Examillingt h.:r .:lationship
b.:t\V.:<:nmi nist.:rials.:a ndala IlJ th.:p ublic's p.:r.:.:ptillllof th.:prim.: minst.:r,asr.:.:ord.:di n
publi<:opinions urwys,maysh.:dsom.: lighto nthis qu.:stilln. ltmayb.:thatth.:p rim.:
ministcrs choice to force the resignation ofa minister is being affected by changes in his
popularity rathe r than the party' s public support.
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